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I. INTRODUCTION 
In March 2009, the United States Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision in Crawford v. Washington1
 
       †  Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.  The author is a 
former Chair of the Association of American Law Schools Section on Evidence, 
Professor of Law at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law from 
1989 to 2000, and Associate Academic Dean from 1996 to 1998.  I want to thank 
the editors and staff of the William Mitchell Law Review for their hard work 
throughout the year, with special thanks to my editor, Robert Ambrose.   
 1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 turned five years old.  A few 
months later, the consolidated cases Davis v. Washington and 
1
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Hammon v. Indiana2 turned three.  One can only hope that no 
human toddlers have ever inflicted the level of disruption and 
uncertainty wrought by these cases and their progeny, which upset 
the application of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause3 
to hearsay evidence in criminal cases.  In Crawford, Davis, and 
Hammon, the United States Supreme Court created a serious 
hurdle in prosecuting certain kinds of crimes, such as domestic 
violence, elder abuse, and child abuse.4
Part II of this article briefly describes the Crawford debacle, 
arguing that its “cure” was worse than the problem it addressed.  
However, there is no point belaboring the issue because, as the 
Court appears to be refining its analysis, it shows no sign of taking 
another dramatic turn in the near future.  Consequently, Part III 
focuses on the most serious problem created under Crawford: the 
prosecution of crimes involving vulnerable witnesses, particularly 
crimes of domestic violence, elder abuse, and child abuse.  
Focusing on the pragmatics of coping with Crawford, this article 
suggests ways to overcome Crawford’s limitations on admissibility of 
evidence and ways to exclude evidence that is no longer protected 
by the Confrontation Clause after Crawford.
  Investigators and 
prosecutors spent years drafting policies and procedures to 
increase the reliability of statements taken from alleged victims of 
these crimes that were out of court or outside the presence of a 
criminal defendant.  These investigation and interrogation 
techniques were developed to comply with existing Supreme Court 
case law and to increase the integrity of the criminal justice system.  
Today, however, the more structured and careful investigators and 
prosecutors are in collecting hearsay evidence, the more likely the 
courts will bar the use of the evidence under the Confrontation 
Clause, as interpreted in Crawford and its progeny. 
5
 
 2. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 3. The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 4. “[W]ithin days—even hours—of the Crawford decision, prosecutors were 
dismissing or losing hundreds of domestic violence cases that would have 
presented little difficulty in the past.”  Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After 
Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 749 (2005) (citations omitted). 
       5.    See infra Part III.B–C. 
  This article takes the 
perspective of a trial judge who must apply the law as it is given, 
balancing the constitutional rights of the accused against the public 
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss4/6
  
1560 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:4 
interest in resolving the dispute with integrity.6
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CRAWFORD REVOLUTION 
 
A. The Confrontation Clause, B.C.E. (Before the Crawford Era) 
For almost two hundred years after the creation of the Bill of 
Rights, there was relatively little commentary by the Supreme Court 
or scholars on the application of the Confrontation Clause to 
hearsay.  That changed in 1980 when the Court decided Ohio v. 
Roberts.7  In Roberts, the Court held that prior testimony given by an 
unavailable declarant does not violate the Confrontation Clause.8  
The Court established a two-step test: (1) the prosecution must 
“either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability” of the 
declarant; and (2) if the declarant is unavailable to testify, the 
prosecution must show that the hearsay had sufficient “indicia of 
reliability.”9  The “indicia of reliability” can be established in two 
different ways.  First, sufficient reliability “can be inferred without 
more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted 
hearsay exception,”10 which the Court did not define.  Second, the 
prosecution can satisfy the reliability prong of Roberts by making “a 
showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”11
In tacitly overruling Roberts, the Court in Crawford aimed its 
most stinging rebukes at the “reliability” prong of Roberts.
 
12  
According to the Court, it produced tremendous variation and 
uncertainty in application.13
 
       6.    See infra Part III.A. 
 7. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).  The Court moved toward the application of the 
Confrontation Clause to hearsay in California v. Green, holding that a prior 
inconsistent statement made during a preliminary hearing was admissible when 
the same witness testified at trial but claimed to have a poor memory and was 
otherwise uncooperative.  399 U.S. 149, 168 (1970); See also Pointer v. Texas, 380 
U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (applying the Confrontation Clause to the states).   
 8. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 72. 
 9. Id. at 65.  
 10. Id. at 66. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004). 
 13. Id.  
  The “particularized guarantees of 
[the] trustworthiness” approach to proving reliability was not an 
easy, bright-line test.  In practice, courts avoided that route to 
reliability, preferring instead to find that the hearsay had adequate 
“indicia of reliability” because it was admissible under a “firmly 
3
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rooted” hearsay exception.14  Over the years, the Roberts reliability 
prong became rather routine, as courts found that most of the 
common hearsay exceptions were “firmly rooted,” including: prior 
testimony,15 statements made by co-conspirators,16 spontaneous 
exclamations (also called excited utterances),17 and statements 
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.18  This ever-
expanding list of “firmly rooted” hearsay exceptions made it quite 
easy to meet the Roberts reliability prong.  The Court never directly 
clarified what makes a hearsay exception “firmly rooted,” except to 
say that the age19 and popularity20 of the exception were important 
factors.  Evidence scholar folklore posits that a firmly rooted 
hearsay exception is any exception the judge recalls from his or her 
law school days.  In fact, during the Roberts era, the Supreme Court 
found only two hearsay exceptions that were not firmly rooted: the 
residual exception21 and some statements against interest, insofar as 
they amounted to an accomplice’s custodial confession that also 
implicated the defendant.22
Indeed, the Court’s recognition that only some “statements 
against interest” fall within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” 
probably had more to do with the death of Ohio v. Roberts than any 
   
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
 16. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 172 (1987).  
 17. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 357 (1992). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Bourjailly, 483 U.S. at 183. 
 20. White, 502 U.S. at 355. 
 21. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990) (applying Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 803(24), which is Idaho’s version of Federal Rule of Evidence 807).  The 
Court held that a court must look for “particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness” when applying the residual hearsay exception.  Id.  The Court 
further explained that such particularized guarantees of trustworthiness should be 
found in the totality of circumstances “that surround the making of the statement 
and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief.”  Id. at 820.  Other 
independent evidence corroborating the hearsay statements did not matter in 
terms of evaluating the reliability of those statements.  Id. 
 22. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 131 (1999) (applying Federal Rule of 
Evidence 804(b)(3)).  The Court reasoned that such statements “are inherently 
unreliable . . . because an accomplice often has a considerable interest in 
‘confessing and betraying his cocriminal.’” Id. at 131.  These statements are “given 
under conditions that implicate the core concerns of the old ex parte affidavit 
practice—that is, when the government is involved in the statements’ production 
and when the statements describe past events that have not been subjected to 
adversarial testing.”  Id. at 135.  Here, one sees the nascent development of the 
“procedural” dimension of the Confrontation Clause.  See Kirst, infra note 40 and 
accompanying citations. 
4
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other factor.23  The only support Justice Scalia provided for his 
argument that Roberts produced inconsistent or unpredictable 
results were lower court cases interpreting Lilly v. Virginia.24  Lilly 
was a plurality Supreme Court decision, a confusing mélange of 
approaches to the Confrontation Clause problem.  The justices all 
voted to reverse Lilly’s conviction, but only three other justices 
joined Justice Stevens’ opinion, which was based on Roberts.25  The 
four other opinions provided four additional theories.26  It is not 
surprising then that Justice Scalia was able to point to conflicting 
lower court cases dealing with similar facts of confessions of 
accomplices that implicate the accused and are offered under the 
hearsay exception for statements against interest.27  Roberts certainly 
had its faults, such as conflating the Confrontation Clause and the 
hearsay rule, but it is unfair to blame Roberts for the confusion and 
unpredictability generated by Lilly.  In reality, the Roberts reliability 
prong produced very little unpredictability or uncertainty because 
most hearsay statements could be shoved into a “firmly rooted” 
hearsay exception.28
At the same time the Court was expanding the list of “firmly 
rooted” hearsay exceptions, making it easier to satisfy Roberts’s 
reliability requirement, the Court moved steadily toward 
eliminating Roberts’s “unavailability” prong.  For example, in United 
States v. Inadi,
   
29 the Court held that no showing of unavailability was 
required to satisfy the Confrontation Clause when the hearsay was 
admitted as the statement of a co-conspirator.30  The Court 
explained that unavailability was required in Roberts because the 
statement was admitted as prior testimony, which requires 
unavailability as an element under the terms of the hearsay 
exception.31
 
 23. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 131 (1999). 
 24. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63–64 (2004).   
 25. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 120 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, 
JJ.).   
 26. Id. at 140 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. 
(Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 144 (Rehnquist, C.J. & O’Connor & Kennedy, JJ., 
concurring in the judgment).   
 27. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54. 
 28. In contrast, the confusion and uncertainty over the Court’s current 
“testimonial” approach to the Confrontation Clause makes the Roberts’s reliability 
prong looks like a bright-line test. 
 29. 475 U.S. 387 (1986). 
 30. Id. at 395. 
 31. Id. at 393 (applying Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1)). 
  The Court emphasized that the evidence produced by 
5
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statements of co-conspirators could not be obtained through in-
court cross-examination.32  Finally, the Court stressed that, in the 
case of co-conspirators, the benefits of the unavailability prong 
would be insignificant, while the burden on the prosecution to 
produce an unnamed, unindicted co-conspirator would be 
substantial.33  Thus, the Court eliminated Roberts’s unavailability 
prong in the case of co-conspirators, concluding that “the 
Confrontation Clause does not embody such a rule.” 34
A few years later in White v. Illinois,
 
35 the Supreme Court simply 
eliminated “unavailability” as a requirement of the Confrontation 
Clause for all hearsay exceptions.  As a result, unavailability was 
only required where the terms of the federal or state hearsay 
exception required it.  In White, a case involving child sexual abuse, 
the Court held that the child’s out-of-court statements, which were 
admitted over hearsay objections as “spontaneous declarations” 
and “statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment,” were firmly rooted hearsay exceptions and that this was 
sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.36  It was not necessary 
for the prosecution to produce the child in court or to show that 
the child was unavailable to testify.37  The Court reasoned that if the 
defendant wished to confront the child, the defendant was free to 
subpoena the child.38  Minnesota law differs on this issue.  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court established a practice that, when 
requested by the defense, requires prosecutors to call available 
child witnesses in their case-in-chief when child hearsay is being 
admitted against the defendant39
The Roberts decision fell out of favor with scholars long before 
Crawford was decided.
 
40
 
 32. Id. at 395. 
 33. Id. at 396–400. 
 34. Id. at 400. 
 35. 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
 36. Id. at 356 n.8. 
 37. Id. at 356–57. 
 38. Id. 
      39.    State v. Larson, 472 N.W.2d 120, 125 (Minn. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 
1071 (1992).  This approach is praised by Professor Myrna Raeder, who notes that 
although this procedure “was not constitutionally based, it provides a model that 
should be more widely enacted.”   Myrna S. Raeder, Comments on Child Abuse 
Litigation in a “Testimonial” World:  The Intersection of Competency, Hearsay and 
Confrontation, 82 IND. L.J. 1009, 1019 (2007). 
  Roberts was widely criticized as 
 40.  AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST 
PRINCIPLES 125–31 (1997); Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the 
6
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unpredictable, unworkable, and unprincipled, primarily because its 
emphasis on reliability simply parroted the concerns behind the 
hearsay rule, making the Confrontation Clause superfluous.41  
Given the hostility toward Roberts, it is not surprising that courts had 
no trouble circumventing the Roberts requirements under the 
Confrontation Clause in the vast majority of cases.  “Unavailability” 
was required only if it was an element of a hearsay exception; it was 
not a constitutional requirement.  A particularized search for 
reliability was required only when statements were offered under 
the residual hearsay exception and accomplice confessions 
implicating the accused were offered under the hearsay exception 
for statements against interest.  But in the vast majority of cases, it 
was not difficult to avoid those two hearsay exceptions by finding a 
more “firmly rooted” exception.  Because appellate courts have 
always given trial courts wide discretion in deciding whether a 
statement is admissible under a particular hearsay exception,42
 
Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 
557, 558–60 (1992); Carol A. Chase, The Five Faces of the Confrontation Clause, 40 
HOUS. L. REV. 1003, 1054 (2003); Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for 
Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1013 (1998); Randy N. Jonakait, Restoring the 
Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 573 (1988); Laird 
C. Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay: Exemptions from the Constitutional 
Unavailability Requirement, 70 MINN. L. REV. 665, 667 (1986); Roger W. Kirst, The 
Procedural Dimension of Confrontation Doctrine, 66 NEB. L. REV. 485, 490 (1987); Toni 
M. Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-to-Face Confrontations, 40 U. FLA. L.REV. 
863, 870–71 (1988); Myrna S. Raeder, Hot Topics in Confrontation Clause Cases and 
Creating a More Workable Confrontation Clause Framework Without Starting Over, 21 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1013, 1014 (2002); Eileen. A. Scallen, Constitutional Dimensions 
of Hearsay Reform: Toward a Three-Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 MINN. L. REV. 
623, 626 (1992); Eleanor Swift, Smoke and Mirrors: The Failure of the Supreme Court’s 
Accuracy Rationale in White V. Illinois Requires a New Look at Confrontation, 22 CAP. U. 
L. REV. 145, 181 (1993); Andrew Taslitz, Catharsis, The Confrontation Clause, and 
Expert Testimony, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 103, 118–19 (1993).  
 41. Daniel J. Capra, Amending the Hearsay Exception for Declarations Against Penal 
Interest in the Wake of Crawford, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2409, 2409–10 (2005);  
Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth 
Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 575 (1988). 
 the 
 42. The evidentiary rulings of trial courts are notoriously difficult to overturn 
on appeal for reasons of judicial efficiency and deference to the trial judge, who is 
generally in a better position to evaluate the evidence when it is offered than is the 
appellate court, which only reviews the cold record.  See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 725 
N.W.2d 733, 737 (Minn. 2007) (stating that “[w]e afford trial courts considerable 
discretion in admitting evidence” and “review their evidentiary rulings for an 
abuse of that discretion.”); State v. Robinson, 718 N.W.2d 400, 407 (Minn. 2006)  
(stating that the “[e]rroneous admission of evidence that does not have 
constitutional implications is harmless if there is no ‘reasonable possibility that the 
wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict’”) (quoting State v. 
7
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Confrontation Clause, as interpreted in Roberts, presented no 
serious obstacle to the introduction of hearsay evidence against 
criminal defendants. 
At the same time the Court was discarding unavailability as a 
constitutional requirement for the admission of hearsay in criminal 
cases, there was a related development in Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence.  Throughout the 1980s state and federal courts 
began to grapple with difficult prosecutions for child sexual and 
physical abuse.43  These cases are particularly difficult to investigate 
and prosecute because of the problems of gathering and 
presenting information from the primary witnesses to the alleged 
crimes—children.44  Getting reliable in-court testimony from 
children was perceived as difficult because of the perceived limited 
capacity of children to recall events that may be at least several 
months, if not years, old as well as perceived inability to 
communicate clearly about their experiences.45  Moreover, children 
were frequently characterized as being so psychologically 
traumatized by their abuse that they could not be expected to 
testify in front of the alleged abuser without experiencing revived 
or new trauma.46
Lower courts attempted to cope with these problems, using 
“low-tech” and “high-tech” solutions.  However, the Supreme Court 
struck down a “low-tech” solution in Coy v. Iowa,
 
47 holding that the 
trial court violated the defendant’s Confrontation Clause right by 
placing a large screen between the defendant and a child witness.48
 
Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 n.2 (Minn. 1994)); State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 
(Minn. 2003) (observing that “[o]n appeal, the appellant has the burden of 
establishing that the trial court abused its discretion and that appellant was 
thereby prejudiced.”). 
     43.   See Gail S. Goodman, Children's Eyewitness Memory: A Modern History and 
Contemporary Commentary, 62 J. SOC. ISSUES 811, 820–21 (2006) (discussing the 
development of specialists in questioning alleged victims of child abuse). 
     44. Karen J. Saywitz, Gail S. Goodman & Thomas D. Lyon, Interviewing Children 
in and out of Court, in The APSAC Handbook on Child Maltreatment, 349, 359–77 (John 
E.B. Myers et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002). 
     45. Myrna S. Raeder, Enhancing the Legal Profession’s Response to Victims of Child 
Abuse, 24 CRIM. JUSTICE 12, 19 (Spring 2009) (hereinafter “Legal Profession’s 
Response”) (citing TASK FORCE ON CHILD WITNESSES, AM. BAR ASS’N CRIM. JUSTICE 
SECTION, THE CHILD WITNESS IN CRIMINAL CASES 40–42 (2002)). 
 46. Id.  
 47. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). 
 48. Id. at 1020. 
  
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia applied his brand of 
textualism to the Confrontation Clause, finding that “the 
8
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irreducible literal meaning of the Clause” is “[the] right to meet 
face to face all those who appear and give evidence at trial.”49
Yet the Court upheld a “high-tech” solution to the problem of 
child testimony in Maryland v. Craig.
   
50  There the Court held that “a 
State’s interest in the physical and psychological well-being of child 
abuse victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in 
some cases, a defendant’s right to face his or her accusers in 
court.”51  The Court ruled that if the prosecution can show that it is 
“necessary to further an important public policy” and that “the 
reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured,” the court may 
permit a child witness to testify out of the physical presence of the 
defendant through a one-way, closed-circuit television.52
Two years later, the Supreme Court’s decision in White v. 
Illinois
 
53 eliminated “unavailability” as a requirement of the 
Confrontation Clause.54
Craig and White also mark a temporary departure from Justice 
Scalia’s textualist approach to the Confrontation Clause.  The 
majority in Craig reflects the moderate pragmatism of its author, 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who tried to find a compromise 
  White was a godsend to prosecutors of 
child sexual abuse cases.  After White, prosecutors could orchestrate 
their proof more effectively.  If a child was able to testify in person, 
the prosecutor could present the child as an in-court witness.  If the 
child was not able to testify because the child would be traumatized 
by the defendant’s presence, the child could testify via closed-
circuit television.  Further, if the prosecutor could not make the 
required showing of the necessity for closed-circuit television, the 
prosecutor could simply introduce the child’s out-of-court 
statements implicating the defendant by having a parent, doctor, 
nurse, social worker, or teacher repeat the child’s statements on 
the stand.  Of course, the defendant always retained the ability to 
call a child to the witness stand if the defendant wished, even 
though a criminal defendant has no obligation to produce any 
witnesses on his or her behalf. 
 
 49. Id. at 1021 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970) 
(Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 50. 497 U.S. 836 (1990). 
 51. Id. at 853. 
 52. Id. at 850.  Justice Scalia’s continuing interest in the Confrontation Clause 
surfaced when he wrote the majority opinion in another case from the same term.  
United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988). 
 53. 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
 54. Id. at 354–55. 
9
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between the right of the defendant to confront his or her accuser 
and the need of the prosecution to obtain testimony from 
vulnerable witnesses.  Justice Scalia filed a vigorous dissent in 
Craig55 and joined Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in White,56 
setting forth and applying their strict interpretation of the 
Confrontation Clause to “extrajudicial statements . . . contained in 
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, 
prior testimony, or confessions.”57
B. The Confrontation Clause, C.E. (The Crawford Era) 
  Although Justices Scalia and 
Thomas failed to narrow the scope of the Confrontation Clause in 
White, less than a decade later Justice Scalia became the dominant 
voice on the Court on the meaning of the Confrontation Clause, 
even though he had to moderate his textualist approach to do so. 
As the author of the majority opinion in Crawford v. 
Washington,58 Justice Scalia radically altered the application of the 
Confrontation Clause to hearsay evidence by limiting its scope to 
“testimonial statements.”59  Although the text of the Confrontation 
Clause does not refer to “testimonial statements,” Justice Scalia 
reasoned that it is the “testimonial” quality of the evidence that 
makes a hearsay declarant a “witness against” the accused, bringing 
the text of the Confrontation Clause into play.60  Drawing on his 
originalist jurisprudential philosophy, Justice Scalia grounded this 
interpretation of the text of the Confrontation Clause in the status 
of the hearsay rule and its exceptions at the time the Bill of Rights 
was adopted in 1791.61  The Court held that the Confrontation 
Clause bars “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who 
did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the 
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”62
 
 55. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 863 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (referring to the majority’s 
conclusions as “antitextual”).  
      56.    White, 502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment). 
 57. Id. 
 58. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
      59.    Id. at 68. 
 60. Id. at 51. 
      61.    Id. at 53–54. 
   
 62. Id. The only kind of hearsay clearly outside the Crawford test are those 
statements qualifying under the “dying declaration” hearsay exception, where the 
declarant is unavailable and describes the cause of his or her impending death.   
Justice Scalia reasoned that because this exception existed at birth of the 
10
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Justice Scalia refused to set forth a complete definition of the 
term “testimonial,” leaving the development and application of the 
term to countless trial court judges, who would, for the next two 
years, have to make do with the hints dropped in Crawford.  Justice 
Scalia classified only one class of statements as obviously 
“testimonial:” “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a 
grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.”63  The 
Court did not fully explain what it meant by “police interrogations” 
but did indicate that these interrogations involved “structured 
police questioning.”64  The Court held that the evidence in 
question in Crawford was “testimonial” in this sense because it was a 
tape-recorded statement obtained from the defendant’s wife, who 
was questioned by the police while in their custody at the police 
stationhouse.65  Because the defendant had never had an 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness regarding the statements 
and because she was unavailable at trial under the marital privilege, 
the use of the witness’s “testimonial” statements thus violated the 
“new” interpretation of the Confrontation Clause.66
Two years later, in the companion cases Davis v. Washington 
and Hammon v. Indiana,
   
67
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course 
of police interrogation under circumstances objectively 
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is 
to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances 
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 
emergency, and that the primary purpose is to establish or 
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.
 Justice Scalia returned to redefining the 
Confrontation Clause in the context of 911 calls and police 
investigations in the field, two of the most common types of law 
enforcement “interrogation.”  Justice Scalia set forth a revised 
understanding of “testimonial” statements in the context of police 
interrogations:  
68
 
Confrontation Clause, this evidence was sui generis and need not be excluded even 
if it is testimonial.  Id. at 56 n.6. 
 63. Id. at 68. 
 64. Id. at 53.  
 65. Id. at 68. 
 66. Id. at 68–69. 
 67. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).  
 68. Id. at 822. 
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The facts of the consolidated cases illustrated the two different 
scenarios.  The Court held that in Davis, there was an ongoing 
emergency because the complainant called 911 immediately after 
the defendant left her home.69  Justice Scalia described these 
statements as not testimonial because the complainant was seeking 
police assistance for an ongoing emergency and still faced a “bona 
fide physical threat” because the defendant could return.70  In 
contrast, Justice Scalia concluded that the statement in Hammon v. 
Indiana was testimonial because the complainant made the 
statements to responding police officers after the officers separated 
the suspect from the complainant; therefore, the emergency ended 
when the police arrived on the scene and took control of the 
suspect.71  Justice Scalia rejected efforts to broaden the category of 
nontestimonial statements, noting that even if a 911 call began as 
part of an ongoing emergency, it could become an effort to collect 
evidence of a past crime.72
In the three years after Davis, the two Justices who opposed the 
shift in Crawford, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, left 
the court.  And there were two more notable Supreme Court 
decisions interpreting the Confrontation Clause—one that drew a 
bright line and one that did not.  In Whorton v. Bockting,
   
73 the Court 
provided one of the few clear statements on the Confrontation 
Clause, holding that its Crawford decision was not retroactive.74  In 
reaching this decision, the Court stated plainly that, under 
Crawford, “the Confrontation Clause has no application to 
[nontestimonial] statements.”75
Following this brief moment of (relative) clarity, the Court 
blocked the path many courts tried to take after Crawford to allow 
the use of hearsay from unavailable witnesses in domestic violence 
and child abuse cases—the doctrine of forfeiture.  The common 
law doctrine of forfeiture is grounded in a principle of equity: a 
  Nontestimonial hearsay could be 
excluded under the state or federal evidence rules or other 
constitutional provisions, but the Sixth Amendment no longer 
provided a basis for exclusion.   
 
 69. Id. at 817–19. 
 70. Id. at 826–27. 
 71. Id. at 829–30. 
 72. Id. at 832. 
 73. 549 U.S. 406 (2007). 
 74. Id. at 409. 
 75. Id. at 420. 
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person should not be able to profit from his wrongdoing.76  Some 
jurisdictions, including federal evidence law, codified the concept 
of forfeiture in a hearsay exception.77  After Crawford, however, 
prosecutors turned to forfeiture not as a hearsay exception but as a 
constitutional principle, relying on dicta in both Crawford and Davis 
to overcome the Confrontation Clause.  In both cases, Justice Scalia 
suggested that “forfeiture by wrongdoing” was a path around the 
Confrontation Clause barrier because it was part of the original 
understanding of confrontation doctrine.78  Domestic violence 
victim advocates and prosecutors argued that defendants in 
domestic abuse cases forfeited their right to confrontation where 
the defendants’ actions resulted in the unavailability of the 
witness/victim at trial.79  They argued that this was the only 
reasonable response after Crawford, which made these cases difficult 
to prosecute successfully.  In domestic violence cases, the victim 
and other witnesses frequently recant earlier allegations against an 
accused and refuse to testify against the defendant at trial, forcing 
the prosecutors to rely on pre-trial statements made by these 
witnesses to police and other law enforcement officials.80  Crawford’s 
holding clearly banned such “testimonial” statements where the 
witness was unavailable to testify at trial and there was no prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.81
 
 76. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–59 (1878) (stating that the 
rule of forfeiture “has its foundation in the maxim that no one shall be permitted 
to take advantage of his own wrong . . . a maxim based on the principles of 
common honesty.”).  
 77. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). 
 78. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004); Davis v. Washington, 547 
U.S. 813, 833 (2006). 
 79. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 814–15 (Minn. 2005) (dictum) 
(“In Minnesota, a defendant will be found to have forfeited by his own 
wrongdoing his right to confront a witness against him if the state proves that the 
defendant engaged in wrongful conduct, that he intended to procure the witness’s 
unavailability, and that the wrongful conduct actually did procure the witness’s 
unavailability”) (citing State v. Fields, 678 N.W.2d 341, 347 (Minn. 2004)). 
 80. See Lininger, supra note 4, at 751 (summarizing some of the reasons why 
witnesses to and victims of domestic violence recant or refuse to testify, including 
“fear of retaliation, economic dependence on the batterer, and concern about the 
possibility that the state would remove children from a household that has 
experienced domestic violence”). 
 81. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
  Thus, prosecutors 
increasingly argued that a defendant whose criminal conduct 
resulted in a witness being unavailable could not complain about 
the lack of opportunity for cross-examination.   
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Finally, in Giles v. California,82 the Court found an opportunity 
to clarify the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” solution to Crawford’s 
hurdles in domestic-violence cases.83  However, instead of 
establishing a bright-line rule, the Giles Court splintered, producing 
only a murky plurality decision.  All of the justices agreed that 
common law recognized a forfeiture doctrine that allowed “the 
introduction of statements of a witness who was ‘detained’ or ‘kept 
away’ by the ‘means or procurement’ of the defendant.”84  But the 
Court could not agree on the standard for finding forfeiture.  The 
defendant in Giles was charged with murdering his girlfriend but 
argued that the shooting was in self-defense.85  At trial, the 
prosecution introduced statements incriminating the defendant 
that the victim had made to a police officer who responded to an 
earlier assault.86  The California Supreme Court held that the 
defendant had forfeited his Confrontation Clause objection by 
killing his girlfriend, regardless of whether he specifically intended 
to do so to keep her from testifying.87  Yet after a thorough 
discussion of the historical treatment of the forfeiture doctrine, the 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing 
doctrine applies only where the defendant engaged in wrongdoing 
with the purpose of preventing the witness’s testimony.88
There were essentially three approaches in Giles.  Justice Scalia 
castigated those who criticized the consequences of his originalist 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence on the prosecution of modern 
domestic violence cases, rejecting “a special, improvised, 
Confrontation Clause for those crimes that are frequently directed 
against women. . . .”
   
89  However, what Justice Scalia taketh away 
with one hand, his other hand giveth.  Although Justice Scalia 
would require a showing of specific intent to make the witness 
unavailable for the forfeiture doctrine to apply, he opined that this 
showing could be met in many domestic violence cases when it 
culminates in murder because of the “intent to isolate the victim.”90
 
 82. 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at  2683  (Scalia, J.); id. at 2697 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 85. Id. at 2681. 
 86. Id. 
 87. People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 2678, 2682 (Cal. 2007). 
 88. Giles, 128 S.Ct. at 2683–84. 
 89. Id. at 2693. 
 90. Id. 
  
Justice Souter argued in a concurring opinion that Justice Scalia’s 
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historical analysis of the forfeiture doctrine was inconclusive and 
unconvincing.91  Nevertheless, Justice Souter joined most of Justice 
Scalia’s opinion, fearing that without a requirement that the 
defendant specifically intended to make the witness unavailable, 
the forfeiture doctrine could bootstrap a finding of witness 
unavailability into a conclusion of murder.92  However, Justice 
Souter suggested that the required showing of intent could be 
inferred by proof of a “classic abusive relationship.”93  Finally, 
Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy, 
arguing that a showing of intentional misconduct should suffice if 
the defendant should have known that it would prevent the witness 
from testifying.94  Justice Breyer’s survey of the common law showed 
that the requirement was only that “the witness’ absence was the 
known consequence of the defendant’s intentional wrongful act.”95  
Justice Breyer’s most powerful comments come toward the end of 
the dissent, as he points out that Justice Scalia and, even more so, 
Justice Souter’s concurring opinion, created a type of presumption 
in the case of domestic violence cases.96  The presumption is that 
where the fact pattern falls into a classic domestic violence pattern, 
there is likely to be the required purpose or design to make the 
declarant unavailable and thus forfeit the right of confrontation.97  
Justice Breyer stresses that he agrees with this approach, but he 
points out that it is more in line with his approach that requires 
only a showing that the defendant knew the likely consequences of 
his actions would make the witness unavailable to testify.98  He 
dissents only because the Justices refuse to apply the same 
approach they would apply to domestic violence cases to all cases.99
III. COPING WITH THE CRAWFORD REVOLUTION.  
  
The clear losers in the Crawford upheaval are the courts, 
especially the state trial court judges who are responsible for the 
lion’s share of criminal trials in this country.100
 
 91. Id. at 2694–95 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 92. Id. at 2694–95 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 93. Id. at 2695 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 94. Id. at 2698–99 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 95. Id. at 2701. 
 96. Id. at 2708–09. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 2078. 
 99. Id. 
  State trial court 
 100. Wendy N. Davis, Hearsay, Gone Tomorrow? Domestic Violence Cases at Issue as 
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judges struggle to apply the almost perversely cryptic formulations 
of “testimonial hearsay” emanating from the Supreme Court to the 
messy real-life factual contexts that trial courts face every day.  
Thus, this section is for them, those overworked and underpaid 
public servants who must somehow find a balance, however 
imperfect, among: (1) the constitutional rights of the accused, who 
are entitled to a presumption of innocence against even the most 
heinous of accusations, (2) the interests of vulnerable victims of 
physical and sexual abuse in having their abusers prosecuted and 
punished, and (3) the interest of society in resolving disputes in a 
criminal justice system that has integrity.  Thus, taking the current 
case law as we find it, here are some basic principles for handling 
confrontation between a criminal defendant and a difficult witness, 
such as a child, an adult with limited mental capacity, or a victim or 
witness to domestic violence who refuses to cooperate. 
A. Applying Crawford, Even with Difficult Witnesses 
Five years after Crawford, how does one apply Confrontation 
Clause to hearsay evidence?  In a nutshell:  
 
(1) Are the out-of-court statements “testimonial?”  For 
now, we know that testimonial statements include the 
following: affidavits; prior testimony; stationhouse police 
interrogations; and nonemergency, investigatory 
statements about past events taken by law enforcement 
officials, including police and 911 operators. If the 
evidence is nontestimonial, there is no Confrontation 
Clause problem (although there may still be a hearsay or 
other evidentiary barrier to admissibility).101
(2) If the evidence is testimonial, is the declarant is 
unavailable to testify at trial?  If the evidence is 
testimonial, but the declarant testifies at trial, there is no 
Confrontation Clause problem with admitting the prior 
statements.
 
 
102
 
Judges Consider Which Evidence to Allow, ABA J., Sept. 2004, at 22, 22–24. But see, 
Roger Kirst, Does Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for Confrontation Doctrine? 71 
BROOK. L. REV. 35, 99 (2005). 
 101. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 102. See infra Part III.B.1. (discussing the “Warm Breathing Body” rule). 
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(3) If the evidence is testimonial and the declarant is 
unavailable to testify at trial, was there a prior opportunity 
to cross-examine the declarant about the statements?  If 
there was a prior opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant about the statements, such as at a preliminary 
hearing, then there is no Confrontation Clause problem 
with admitting the statements. 
 
(4) Do either of the two current exceptions to the 
Confrontation Clause analysis apply? 
a. Was the statement admitted as a “dying declaration?”  If so, 
the evidence is “sui generis” and thus not subject to the 
Confrontation Clause.103
Unfortunately, this summary of current Confrontation Clause 
doctrine leaves plenty of unresolved issues, especially in the case of 
domestic violence, elder abuse and child abuse.  Determining when 
a statement “testimonial” continues to be thorny.  For example, if a 
social worker, a teacher or a doctor, all of whom have a legal duty 
to report child abuse, questions a child about suspected abuse, are 
the child’s responses testimonial?  Where is the turning point when 
a police interrogation moves from dealing with an “ongoing 
emergency” to investigating and collecting evidence of a crime?  In 
a domestic abuse, elder abuse, or child abuse situation, exactly how 
much evidence does the court need that the defendant’s purpose 
or design was to exercise control over his or her victim’s actions—
including the victim’s ability to testify to admit the statements of a 
victim who is now “unavailable” (e.g., dead or refusing to testify, 
 
b. Did the accused engage in conduct purposely designed to 
prevent the witness from testifying?  If so, the accused has 
forfeited the Confrontation Clause objection by 
wrongdoing. 
 
If the statements are testimonial, the declarant is unavailable 
to testify at trial, there was no prior opportunity to cross-examine 
the declarant about the statements, and neither the dying 
declaration nor forfeiture by wrongdoing exceptions apply, then 
the evidence must be excluded under the Confrontation Clause of 
the Sixth Amendment. 
 
 103. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 55 n. 6.; see also Stephen J. Cribari, Is Death Different?  
Dying Declarations and the Confrontation Clause after Crawford, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1542 (2009). 
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despite a subpoena)?   
As much as I would like to resolve the quandaries about 
whether such statements are testimonial, I am as frustrated and 
befuddled as most of the trial courts that must resolve the question.  
Thus, the remainder of this article sidesteps Crawford’s 
“testimonial” framework and takes a different approach by turning 
to evidentiary doctrines that have largely been ignored in the 
excitement and confusion generated by Crawford, Davis/Hammon, 
and Giles.  These doctrines deserve far more attention because they 
offer an opportunity either for overcoming the Confrontation 
Clause objection or for excluding evidence even if it surmounts the 
Crawford analysis.  Whether one approaches the issue from the 
perspective of the prosecution, the defense or the trial judge, in the 
highly emotional and difficult context of domestic violence and 
child abuse prosecutions, it is important to remember that 
Crawford’s “testimonial” framework is not the only game in town.   
B. Prosecution Strategies for Overcoming the Confrontation Clause 
Objection 
1. The “Warm Breathing Body” Rule 
Simply put: to avoid Confrontation Clause problems, 
prosecutors and judges must work to do everything possible to put 
the declarant (the person who made the out-of-court statement) on 
the witness stand whenever possible.  Putting a witness, who is also a 
hearsay declarant, on the stand—even for a short time and even if 
the witness will not or cannot cooperate or provide meaningful 
information about the underlying facts of the case—eliminates the 
Confrontation Clause objection to the use of out-of-court 
statements by that witness.  However, as discussed more below, it 
will not eliminate problems of competency and lack of personal 
knowledge.  I call this the “Warm Breathing Body” rule, but in 
naming it I do not mean to suggest I approve of it.  It is a sad but 
necessary way to cope with Crawford.  As discussed more below, the 
Warm Breathing Body rule applies even to children or other 
vulnerable witnesses.  Before Crawford, prosecutors frequently 
argued that it was essential to keep children off the witness stand in 
order to protect them from further trauma.104
 
       104.    Raeder, Legal Profession’s Response, supra note 45, at 14 (Spring 2009). 
  Yet child abuse 
researcher Professor John Myers, states that “despite the difficulty, 
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most children are able to testify in the traditional manner, 
especially when they are prepared and supported through the 
process.”105  Empirical research also suggests that the outcome of 
the prosecution has as much impact on the child’s well being than 
whether the child testifies or not.106   Thus, it is especially important 
to understand the significance of the “Warm Breathing Body” rule, 
especially when dealing with children, uncooperative victims of 
domestic violence, and persons with age-related memory problems, 
brain injuries, or other mental challenges.  The origin of the 
“Warm Breathing Body” rule is Justice Scalia’s opinion in United 
States v. Owens.107
On April 12, 1982, John Foster, a correctional counselor 
at the federal prison in Lompoc, California, was attacked 
and brutally beaten with a metal pipe.  His skull was 
fractured, and he remained hospitalized for almost a 
month.  As a result of his injuries, Foster’s memory was 
severely impaired.  When Thomas Mansfield, an FBI agent 
investigating the assault, first attempted to interview 
Foster, on April 19, he found Foster lethargic and unable 
to remember his attacker’s name.  On May 5, Mansfield 
again spoke to Foster, who was much improved and able 
to describe the attack.  Foster named respondent as his 
attacker and identified respondent from an array of 
photographs. 
 
  Justice Scalia summarized the facts: 
Respondent was tried in Federal District Court for assault 
with intent to commit murder under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a).  
At trial, Foster recounted his activities just before the 
attack, and described feeling the blows to his head and 
seeing blood on the floor.  He testified that he clearly 
remembered identifying respondent as his assailant 
during his May 5th interview with Mansfield.  On cross-
examination, he admitted that he could not remember 
seeing his assailant.  He also admitted that, although there 
was evidence that he had received numerous visitors in 
the hospital, he was unable to remember any of them 
except Mansfield, and could not remember whether any 
 
       105.    Id. (quoting JOHN E.B. MYERS, MYERS ON EVIDENCE IN CHILD, DOMESTIC, 
AND ELDER ABUSE CASES § 3.01 (2007)). 
       106.    Id. (citing Jodi A. Quas et al., Childhood Sexual Assault Victims: Long-Term 
Outcomes After Testifying in Criminal Court, 70 MONOGRAPHS OF THE SOCIETY FOR 
RESEARCH IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 88 (No. 2, 2005)). 
       107.    484 U. S. 554 (1988). 
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of these visitors had suggested that respondent was the 
assailant.  Defense counsel unsuccessfully sought to 
refresh his recollection with hospital records, including 
one indicating that Foster had attributed the assault to 
someone other than respondent.  Respondent was 
convicted and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment to be 
served consecutively to a previous sentence.108
To be respectful to Mr. Foster, who survived a terrible attack, 
he was more than a warm breathing body.  But his condition made 
him analogous to one, at least when it came to recalling the facts of 
the attack, including the identity of his attacker.  In his dissent, 
Justice Brennan notes that although Foster had no recollection of 
the first time the FBI agent visited him in his hospital bed, Foster 
described his memory of the FBI agent’s second visit as “vivid.”
 
109  
However, Foster had no recollection of visits from other people 
around the same time, including his own wife, who visited him 
daily.110  Moreover, Foster could not recall whether any of his 
visitors, including prison officials, had ever suggested that the 
defendant was the attacker.111
The Court in Owens reached its result by focusing on the form 
of cross-examination, rather than the substance: “[T]he 
Confrontation Clause guarantees only ‘an opportunity for effective 
cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in 
 
The incongruous nature of the “Warm Breathing Body” rule 
can be illustrated with a simple hypothetical.  If Foster made his 
identification in front of both the FBI agent and a nurse, but then 
died, neither the nurse nor the FBI agent could testify at trial about 
Foster’s identification of the attacker.  It would be meaningless that 
the nurse, who had no knowledge or memory of the attack, could 
corroborate what Foster said in his hospital room.  The defense got 
no more from its actual cross-examination of Foster than it could 
from cross-examining the nurse (or the FBI agent) about Foster’s 
identification of the defendant.  Only the fact that Foster took the 
stand at trial (thankfully warm and breathing, but clueless as to the 
circumstances of the attack) made it possible, in the eyes of the 
Supreme Court, to use Foster’s hospital room identification of the 
defendant as his attacker. 
 
 108. Id. at 556.   
 109. Id. at 565 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 110. Id. at 565–66. 
 111. Id. 
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whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”112  
All that is required is “that the defendant has the opportunity to 
bring out such matters as the witness’ bias, his lack of care and 
attentiveness, his poor eyesight, and even (what is often a prime 
objective of cross-examination . . .) the very fact that he has a bad 
memory.”113
In State v. Holliday,
 
114 the Minnesota Supreme Court applied 
the “Warm Breathing Body” rule in upholding the defendant’s 
murder conviction arising from a March 2006 shooting and death 
of an innocent bystander in a popular entertainment district in 
downtown Minneapolis.115  At the defendant’s trial, the State called 
“A.A.” as a witness, who was allegedly the person whom the 
defendant meant to shoot and kill.116  A police sergeant interviewed 
A.A. in April 2006 and a Hennepin County prosecutor interviewed 
A.A. twice, in May and September 2006.117  In those interviews, A.A. 
claimed to be the defendant’s actual target.118  At trial, however, 
A.A. testified that he could not remember those conversations with 
the police and prosecutor, even after reviewing the police 
sergeant’s report and a report of his May interview with the 
prosecutor.119  After reviewing another report from the September 
meeting with the prosecutor, A.A. said he remembered talking to 
someone in the county attorney’s office but could not remember 
what the conversation was about.120
The trial court allowed the police sergeant to testify about his 
April interview with A.A.
  
121  In addition, the court allowed 
testimony from Jessica Immerman, a legal services specialist from 
the prosecutor’s office, regarding the September 2006 meeting 
with the prosecutor.122
 
 112. Id. at 559 (citation omitted).   
 113. Id. (citation omitted).  
 114. 745 N.W.2d 556 (Minn. 2008).  
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 561. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.  On cross-examination, A.A. admitted that his regular ecstasy use 
possibly affected his ability to remember.  Id.  
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
  Immerman, who was present at the 
September 2006 meeting between A.A. and the prosecutor, 
testified that the prosecutor read a report of the police sergeant’s 
April interview to A.A. and that A.A. acknowledged he made the 
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statements included in the report.123  The court then allowed 
Immerman to read into the record the report of the April police 
interview.124  Immerman then testified that the prosecutor read to 
A.A. a memorandum the prosecutor made of their May meeting, 
and A.A. affirmed its contents.125  The court then allowed 
Immerman to read into the record the memorandum of the May 
meeting, which included A.A.’s allegation that appellant was 
chasing and shooting at him when the victim was shot.126  Finally, 
the court allowed Immerman to read into the record a portion of a 
memorandum summarizing A.A.’s September meeting with 
prosecutor, which documented A.A.’s affirmations of the April 
report and the May memorandum.127  The trial judge overruled the 
defendant’s hearsay and Confrontation Clause objections.128  The 
trial court overruled the hearsay objection under the recorded 
recollection exception and the residual exception.129  Although the 
trial court found A.A.’s statements to be “testimonial” under 
Crawford, the trial court overruled the Confrontation Clause 
objection because A.A. testified at trial and was subject to cross-
examination.130  The trial judge later convicted the defendant in 
the bench trial.131
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the defendant’s 
convictions, resting its ruling squarely on Owens and dicta from 
Crawford.
   
132  The Minnesota court acknowledged that Owens could 
be distinguished from the case before it in that the witness in Owens 
could recall making the prior identification, while in this case, A.A. 
could not recall the conversations where he allegedly implicated 
the defendant.133
 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 561–62. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 559. 
 132. Id. at 565–67. 
 133. Id. at 566. The Court was referring to Foster’s hospital room conversation 
with the F.B.I. agent, identifying Owens as his attacker. 
  The Minnesota court, however, held that 
Crawford’s direction was clear: “the Court in Crawford explicitly 
stated in a footnote that a declarant’s appearance for cross-
examination at trial removes all Confrontation Clause barriers to 
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the admission of his or her prior statements. . . .”134
Although the “Warm Breathing Body” rule is unpalatable, 
especially as applied to its outer limits with an uncooperative 
witness in Holliday one can understand the motivation behind it.  
Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Owens, offered an alternative: he 
would have applied the rule from Green v. California that “the Sixth 
Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to engage in 
cross-examination sufficient to ‘affor[d] the trier of fact a 
satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of [a] prior 
statement. . . .’”
   
135
In fact, Justice Brennan raised many of the difficulties himself 
in his dissent in Green.
  But one wonders how many and what types of 
questions asked on cross-examination would suffice to satisfy the 
trier of fact about the truth of a prior statement?  Justice Brennan’s 
call for more than just an opportunity for cross-examination, his 
demand for an effective and meaningful cross-examination, has 
strong intuitive appeal, but it seems difficult if not impossible to 
measure in practice.   
136  In that case, the trial witness had 
previously testified at the preliminary hearing (where he was 
subject to cross-examination) and identified the defendant as the 
person who sold him marijuana.137  At the actual trial, however, the 
witness was “markedly evasive and uncooperative on the stand.”138  
The Court held that the use of the witness’s prior testimony at the 
preliminary hearing, for the substantive purpose of identifying the 
defendant as the person who sold him drugs, did not violate the 
Confrontation Clause where the prior testimony was subject to 
cross-examination.139  In dissent, Justice Brennan questioned how 
cross-examination at the preliminary hearing in the actual case 
could serve as a substitute for effective cross-examination at trial 
where “defense counsel . . . did not engage in a searching 
examination” at the preliminary hearing.140
 
 134. Id. at 565 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004)).   
 135. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 565 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)). 
 136. See Green, 399 U.S. at 189 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 137. Id. at 190. 
 138. Id. at 151–52 (White, J.) (quoting People v. Green, 451 P.2d 422, 423 
(Cal. 1969)). 
 139. Id. at 168–69. 
 140. Id. at 191 (Brennan, J., dissenting).   
  Moreover, Justice 
Brennan questioned how the adequacy of the prior cross-
examination could be determined in any case: 
23
Scallen: Coping with Crawford: Confrontation of Children and Other Challen
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009
  
2009] COPING WITH CRAWFORD 1581 
[T]oday’s holding raises another practical difficulty: how 
extensive must cross-examination at the preliminary 
hearing be before constitutional confrontation is deemed 
to have occurred?  Is the mere opportunity for face-to-face 
encounter sufficient?  Perhaps so.  The Court states that 
‘respondent had every opportunity to cross-examine 
Porter as to his statement’ at the hearing. Does that mean 
that if defense counsel fails to take advantage of the 
opportunity that the accused can subsequently be 
convicted at trial on the basis of wholly untested evidence?  
If more than an unexercised chance to cross-examine is 
required, how thorough and effective must the 
questioning be before it satisfies the Confrontation 
Clause?  Is it significant, for example, that in the present 
case neither the defense nor prosecution explored the 
most elemental fact about Porter’s testimony-the 
possibility that he was under the influence of drugs at the 
time of the alleged offense?141
This was, in fact, the second time Justice Brennan faulted both 
the prosecution and defense counsel for failing to question the 
witness at the preliminary hearing about whether he was under the 
influence of drugs at the time of the drug transaction with the 
defendant.
 
142
 The “Warm Breathing Body” rule allows for an unsatisfactory 
opportunity for cross-examination, but tying the Confrontation 
Clause to a standard of “meaningful,” “effective,” “full” or 
“searching” cross-examination does not work either.  However, as 
discussed below in the section on taking evidence rules seriously,
  The message was clear: Justice Brennan would have 
conducted a different cross-examination, but the practical problem 
is also clear.  Once the Court starts to examine what was asked and 
what was not asked during cross-examination, the Confrontation 
Clause analysis becomes impractical.                   
143
 
 141. Id. at 200 n.8 (citation omitted). 
 142. See also id. at 191 n.4. 
 143. See infra Part III.C.1–2. 
 
this does not mean the trial court is powerless to exclude testimony 
and prior statements of a witness who testifies that he or she has no 
recollection of an underlying event.  That evidentiary problem is 
best dealt with as a problem of competency or lack of personal 
knowledge of the underlying facts. 
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2. Improving Competency Determinations 
 The prospect of using the “Warm Breathing Body” rule, as is 
the case with all aspects of confrontation, is most unpleasant in the 
case of child or otherwise vulnerable witnesses.  Moreover, it is a 
difficult judgment call because in the case of children or other 
vulnerable witnesses, the “Warm Breathing Body” rule frequently 
overlaps with the concept of “competency.”  As it has been 
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the “Warm 
Breathing Body” rule responds to the requirement of both some 
hearsay exceptions and the Confrontation Clause that the hearsay 
declarant be available and testifying at trial and thus subject to 
cross-examination.144
 In addition to sometimes being confused with the personal 
knowledge requirement, competency is confusing because it is 
steeped in political and social prejudice.  The common law was 
obsessed with the fear that a witness might commit perjury.  As a 
result, “parties, spouses of parties, accomplices, persons with an 
interest in the litigation, convicted felons, children, and atheists 
were all at one time viewed as incompetent.”
   
 “Competency,” in contrast, means more than just showing 
up—more than just getting the declarant on the witness stand.  
“Competency” is sometimes defined in different ways by state 
statutes, but at its core, competency means that the witness (1) is 
capable of distinguishing fact from fiction; (2) is willing to promise, 
swear an oath or make some other kind of affirmation or assurance 
that he or she will tell the truth; and (3) is capable of 
communicating about the facts in issue.  It is important to separate 
the concept of competency from other evidentiary doctrines.  For 
example, when some courts or commentators talk about a witness 
testifying “reliabily” or “correctly,” in all likelihood, they are not 
talking about competency but rather whether the witness has 
personal knowledge of the facts about which they will testify.  It is 
possible for a witness to sit on the witness stand and promise clearly 
and intelligibly to tell the truth but not to have first-hand 
knowledge of the disputed facts. 
145
 
    144.    United States v. Owens, 484 U. S. 554 (1988). 
 145. 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE       
§ 6:2, at 1 (3d ed. 2008). 
  “Incompetent” 
meant that these individuals could not take the witness stand in a 
court of law to testify about any subject, no matter how reliable or 
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knowledgeable the individual might be about the facts of a case.146  
These automatic disqualifications eventually were abolished and 
became grounds for impeaching the credibility of the witness or 
raised a ground of evidentiary privilege.147
Today, both federal law and Minnesota law follow the modern 
approach of competency provisions.
   
148  Thus, a convicted felon can 
give testimony but is subject to impeachment under Federal and 
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 609.  A spouse of a litigant or criminal 
defendant may testify, subject to the spousal testimonial privilege 
and the marital confidential communications privilege.149 Under 
federal law, witnesses are competent “except as otherwise 
provided.”150 This creates, in essence, “a presumption that everyone 
is competent to testify, and in the case of ordinary witnesses (as 
opposed to experts), the burden of showing that a particular 
person is not competent to testify rests with the party challenging 
the witness.”151
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 601 also follows the modern 
approach but states simply that at existing state law determines the 
controlling principles of competency.  The leading Minnesota case 
setting forth the general principle of competency is State ex rel. 
Dugal v. Tahash:
 
152
Determination of a person’s competency as a witness is 
within the sound discretion of the trial court and is 
ordinarily made by such preliminary examination of the 
proposed witness as may be deemed necessary by the 
court.  If it appears from the examination that the witness 
understands the obligation of an oath and is capable of 
correctly narrating the facts to which his testimony relates, 
the witness is competent in fact and should be permitted 
to testify.
 
153
 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. 
    148.    FED. R. EVID. 601; MINN. R. EVID. 602; MINN. STAT. § 595.02 (2008).  The 
primary exceptions to these rules are the provisions that make a judge or juror 
incompetent to testify as a witness in proceedings in which they are sitting. FED. R. 
EVID. 605, 606.  MINN. R. EVID. 605, 606.  Minnesota expands that categorical 
exclusion, with only a few exceptions, to any person “presiding at any alternative 
dispute resolution proceeding.”  MINN. STAT. 595.02, § subd.1a.  
 149. Id. 
 150. FED. R. EVID. 601. 
 151. MUELLER & KIRPATRICK, supra note 145, at 1. 
 152. 278 Minn. 175, 153 N.W.2d 232 (1967).   
 153. Id. at 177–78, 153 N.W.2d at 234. 
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 Minnesota has codified principles of competency, especially as 
they pertain to children and vulnerable adults, in Minnesota 
Statutes section 595.02, which provides in relevant part: 
Subdivision 1. Competency of witnesses. 
Every person of sufficient understanding, including a 
party, may testify in any action or proceeding, civil or 
criminal, in court or before any person who has authority 
to receive evidence, except as provided in this 
subdivision: . . .  
 
(f) Persons of unsound mind and persons intoxicated at 
the time of their production for examination are not 
competent witnesses if they lack capacity to remember or 
to relate truthfully facts respecting which they are 
examined. . . . 
 
(n) A child under ten years of age is a competent witness 
unless the court finds that the child lacks the capacity to 
remember or to relate truthfully facts respecting which 
the child is examined.  A child describing any act or event 
may use language appropriate for a child of that age.154
 
 
Enacted in 1987, this statute reversed the legislative approach to 
the competency of children and adults with mental challenges or 
under the influence of mind-altering substances and created a 
rebuttable presumption that such witnesses are competent to 
testify.155  In State v. Lanam,156
[The statute] does not mean that the court is to question the 
child on the details of possible testimony, but rather means 
 the Minnesota Supreme Court 
explained the purpose of a competency hearing after this change 
in the law:   
 
 
    154. MINN. STAT. § 595.02.  In addition, Minnesota Statutes section 595.06 
provides in relevant part that: 
When an infant, or a person apparently of weak intellect, is produced as 
a witness, the court may examine the infant or witness to ascertain 
capacity, and whether the person understands the nature and obligations 
of an oath, and the court may inquire of any person what peculiar 
ceremonies the person deems most obligatory in taking an oath. 
     155.    See MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 1(f), repealed by 1987 Minn. Laws, ch. 120   
§ 1 (stating that children under ten years old are presumed incompetent to 
testify). 
     156.   459 N.W.2d 656 (Minn.1990). 
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that the court should determine in a general way whether the 
child remembers or can relate events truthfully. The jury will 
judge the child's credibility and decide the weight to assign the 
testimony. A competency hearing is not a credibility hearing. 
Competency concerns the child’s ability to be truthful and to 
understand the importance of telling the truth in court. It also 
concerns the child’s ability to remember and relate events. 
Whether a child is easily led goes more to credibility than to 
competency. Even adults at trial become inconsistent upon 
cross-examination. It is the jury’s province to sort out the 
inconsistencies and determine credibility, the court’s province 
to determine competency. Where the court is in doubt as to 
the child’s competency, it is best to err on the side of 
determining the child to be competent.157
 There is another part of Section 595.02 that can easily confuse 
the competency analysis.  Section 595.02, subd. 3 tries to provides a 
“super” hearsay exception for certain out-of-court statements 
“alleging, explaining, denying, or describing any act of sexual 
contact or penetration performed with or on” or any physical abuse 
of the hearsay declarant.  The statute makes the out-of-court 
statements admissible for the truth of what they assert if the court 
finds that the circumstances surrounding the making of the 
statement bear “sufficient indicia of reliability” and the declarant 
either testifies or is unavailable, but there is corroborative evidence 
of the act.  The statute requires advance notice that the evidence 
will be offered and expressly “includes video, audio, or other 
recorded statements.”
 
 
158
 
     157.   Id. at 659–60. 
     158.   MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3. 
  Although this statutory provision is placed 
in the general competency statute, it is actually a hearsay exception 
that incorporated the Roberts confrontation clause test, which was in 
effect at the time the statute was created in 1987.  It was intended 
to provide an exception to the hearsay rule that would 
simultaneously ensure the evidence passed the Confrontation 
Clause analysis.  It is not a competency test, for its last line 
specifically states that “[a]n unavailable witness includes an 
incompetent witness,” which sends us circling back to the 
competency provisions of 595.02, subd.1(f) and (n), which 
presume that a child or mentally challenged adult is competent to 
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testify unless proved otherwise.  
 Crawford has now made this statute constitutionally suspect, at 
least in part.  Where the statement about sexual or physical abuse is 
made in response to structured questioning by law enforcement 
officials, it is clearly testimonial under Crawford.  Thus, the only 
route to admissibility of the out-of-court statements is to have the 
witness testify, for Crawford prohibits such evidence where the 
declarant is unavailable to testify and there has been no prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.  One big area of 
contention and confusion is whether statements made to forensic 
interviewers (who specialize in child abuse investigation) and 
statements made to professionals (such as doctors, teachers, social 
workers who have a mandatory statutory duty to report such abuse) 
fall under this category of testimonial statements.159  This issue will 
ultimately have to be resolved by the United States Supreme Court, 
but in the meantime, such statements are constitutionally suspect 
even if they satisfy the reliability provisions of Minnesota Statutes 
section 595.02, subd. 3, or any other hearsay exception.  The 
upshot is that in Minnesota, a child or mentally challenged witness 
should take the stand unless proven to be incompetent under 
Minnesota law.160  Where there is doubt about the witness’s 
competency, they are to be resolved in favor of having the witness 
testify.161
 Recent empirical research focused on obtaining more reliable 
evidence from child witnesses suggests that courts are far too 
reluctant to find that young children are competent to testify.
  Having the witness take the stand cures the Crawford 
problem, through the magic of the “Warm Breathing Body” rule.    
162
 
    159.   See Bobadilla v. Carlson, 570 F.Supp.2d 1098 (D. Minn. 2008) (granting 
amended petition for writ of habeas corpus in child sexual abuse case resting on 
statements made to forensic interviewers and medical professionals). 
    160.   In the 2009 Minnesota Legislative Session, legislators in both houses 
introduced legislation to amend MINN. STAT. 595.02, subd. 3, to allow a child 
witness to testify either in person or through “an alternative method under [MINN. 
STAT.] 595.10].  See 2009 Minn. Senate File No. 563, Minn. First Regular Sess. of 
the Eighty-Sixth Legislative Sess. (Introduced Feb. 9, 2009); 2009 Minn. House File 
No. 720, Minn. First Regular Sess. of the Eighty-Sixth Legislative Sess. (Introduced 
Feb 12, 2009). 
    161.   Lanam, 459 N.W.2d at 659–60.  Minnesota Statute 595.10 essentially 
incorporates the Supreme Court’s decision in Craig.  Thus, if Craig survives 
Crawford, and if this legislation is ultimately passed into law, it would make it easier 
to introduce all sorts of out-of-court statements by children, including testimonial 
statements made to police officers and forensic interviewers. 
  
 162. Thomas D. Lyon & Karen J. Saywitz, Young Maltreated Children’s Competence 
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First, research suggests that trial judges and advocates may be 
skewing the competency hearing results by the way they frame the 
questions, especially those aimed at determining whether the child 
is able to and will follow a moral obligation to tell the truth, 
meaning that the child will reject false statements of fact.  Professor 
Tom Lyon, who has focused on developing protocols for 
questioning children about abuse both during the investigatory 
phase and during trial, explains: 
[f]ar too often, children are kept off the stand not 
because of their incompetency but because of the limited 
competency of their interrogator.  Children should not be 
asked whether they know the meaning of truth and lie or 
asked to define the terms.  They should not be asked 
whether they have ever told a lie.  They should not be 
asked hypothetical questions about the consequences of 
lying, particularly hypothetical questions in which they are 
the speaker (What would happen if you told a lie?).  Many 
children will perform poorly at these questions despite 
being quite capable of identifying statements as true or 
false and recognizing that lie-tellers are punished.163
Professor Lyon and his co-author Karen Saywitz, from the 
U.C.L.A. Medical Center, created a simplified competency 
assessment tool that is available online for download without 
charge.
 
164  The focus of the assessment is to determine whether a 
child can determine and communicate that some statements of fact 
are false.  This assessment was developed because “even children 
who have not learned labels for true and false statements are 
capable of rejecting false statements.”165
 
to Take the Oath, 3 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 3, 16–27 (1999), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1061&context=thomas 
lyon. 
 163. Thomas J. Lyon, The Supreme Court, Hearsay, and Crawford: Implications for 
Child Interviewers¸ AM. PROF. SOC’Y ON THE ABUSE OF CHILDREN ADVISOR, 
Summer/Fall 2008, at 5, available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent. 
cgi?article=1058& context=thomaslyon. 
 164. Thomas D. Lyon & Karen J. Saywitz, Qualifying Children to Take the 
Oath: 
Materials for Interviewing Professionals (May 2000), http://works.bepress.com/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=thomaslyon. 
 165. Lyon & Saywitz, supra note 44, at 5. 
  The assessment is 
designed “to both minimize the difficulties children face in 
defining and discussing the truth and lies, and to ensure that 
children will not falsely appear competent due to guessing or 
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following the questioner’s lead.”166  Over the course of the 
assessment, the interrogator asks whether there are bad 
consequences for saying something that is false.  The interrogator 
poses four scenarios to a child involving the concepts of truth and 
falsity and four scenarios involving morality.  If a child answers all 
four of the scenarios of each type correctly, “this demonstrates 
good understanding of the concept (there is only a 6% likelihood 
that a child would answer four of four problems correctly by 
chance).”167
The first four scenarios present the child with a cartoon.
 
168  
The interrogator asks the child to look at a larger object toward the 
top of the cartoon (for example, a drawing of a sleeping cat).169  
The child is asked to name the object.170  For example, if the child 
says, “that’s a kitty,” the interrogator then confirms the child’s label 
for the object, “Ok, that’s a kitty.”171  The interrogator then calls 
the child’s attention to the lower part of the cartoon, where there is 
a drawing of two boys, each one imagining (in a cartoon callout 
cloud) a different picture.172  One boy imagines a cat; the other boy 
imagines a dog.173  The interrogator then tells the child, “LISTEN 
to what these boys say about the kitty [or whatever label the child 
has used].174  One of them will tell a LIE and one will tell the 
TRUTH, and YOU’LL tell ME which boy tells the TRUTH.”175  The 
interrogator then points to the picture of the boy on the left side of 
the page (who is imagining a cat).176  “THIS boy looks at the [kitty] 
and says ‘IT’S a [kitty].’”177  Then the interrogator points to the 
picture of the boy on the right side of the page and says, “THIS boy 
looks at the [kitty] and says ‘IT’S a PUPPY.’  Which boy told the 
TRUTH?”178
 
 166. Lyon & Saywitz, supra note 44, at 2. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 3–6. 
 169. Id. at 3. 
 170. Id.  
 171. Id.  
 172. Id.  
 173. Id.  
 174. Id.  
 175. Id.  
 176. Id.  
 177. Id.  
 178. Id.  
  The next problem follows the same pattern, except 
the cartoon involves two girls imagining two different kinds of food 
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and the final question is “Which girl told a LIE?”179  These two 
problems are followed by two additional problems, one of which 
asks which character tells the truth and one of which asks which 
character told a lie.180
Which boy is GONNA GET IN TROUBLE? (correct answer 
is boy on the right).
 
The final four problems involve “morality” tasks, which 
evaluate whether a child understands there are negative 
consequences for telling a lie.  The first task puts two cartoon boys 
in front of a cartoon woman judge.  Here is the script for the 
interrogator: 
 
Here’s a Judge.  She wants to know what happened to 
these boys. 
Well, ONE of these boys is GONNA GET IN TROUBLE 
for what he says, and YOU’LL tell ME which boy is 
GONNA GET IN TROUBLE. 
LOOK [child’s name], 
(point to left boy) This boy tells the TRUTH. 
(point to right boy) This boy tells a LIE. 
181
The other three scenarios are structured almost identically, 
except that there is a different adult cartoon character in each 
scenario who “wants to know what happened” to the children.
 
 
182  
All of the adult characters are adult women, but one is “a Lady who 
comes to visit these girls at home” (presumably a social worker or 
guardian ad litem).183  Another character is a doctor.184  The final 
character is “a Grandma.”185  The gender of the children alternates 
between two girls and two boys.186  Note that these questions do not 
ask the children to create abstract definitions of terms such as “lie” 
or “truth.”  The child is asked about concrete, visual situations, not 
conceptual hypotheticals (for example, “What would happen to 
you if you lied?”).187
 
 179. Id. at 4. 
 180. Id. at 5–6. 
 181. Id. at 7. 
 182. Id.  
 183. Id. at 8. 
 184. Id. at 9. 
 185. Id. at 10. 
 186. Id. at 3–10. 
 187. Id. at 11–14. 
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Children and mentally challenged witnesses without abstract 
reasoning skill will have difficulty “swearing to tell the truth” in a 
conventional manner, but this does not mean they are incompetent 
to testify.  There are empirically tested ways of testing an 
individual’s understanding of a moral obligation to reject untrue 
statements of fact and to obtain the individual’s assurance that he 
or she will do so.188
The determination of witness competency is left to the trial 
judge; a reviewing court will only reverse the decision if: (1) it was 
an abuse of discretion;
  Trial judges should try to use these research-
based tools to determine whether a child can sufficiently 
communicate in a truthful manner.   
189 and (2) it is not harmless error.190
3. More Craig, Not Less. 
  Trial 
judges should try to assess witness competency to testify in a 
thorough and age-appropriate manner, especially given the “Warm 
Breathing Body” rule, which may make all the difference between 
admitting videotaped forensic interviews or other kinds of hearsay 
over a Confrontation Clause objection. 
Another problem with vulnerable witnesses is that they may 
experience trauma either from the adversarial courtroom setting 
itself, or, especially in cases of alleged abuse, from the presence of 
the defendant.  The United States Supreme Court held in Maryland 
v. Craig,191
 
    188.    See also infra, note 273, which cites to other empirical research by 
Professor Lyon and others on the best practices for interviewing suspected victims 
of abuse both outside and inside the courtroom. 
 189. Minnesota ex rel. Dugal v. Tahash, 278 Minn. 175, 177–78, 153 N.W.2d 
232, 234 (1967).  Contrast this deferential standard of review with the more 
stringent standard of review for alleged violations of the right to confrontation:  
“We review de novo the district court’s determination of the protections afforded 
by the confrontation clause, while we review the underlying factual determinations 
for clear error.”  United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 552 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(citation omitted).  And compare the more searching review of the similar-
sounding but distinctly different issue of competency to stand trial in State v. 
Ganpat, 732 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 2007).  If the issue is competency to stand trial, as 
opposed to competency to testify, the appellate courts will do an “independent[] 
review [of] the record to determine if the district court gave ‘proper weight’ to the 
evidence produced and if ‘its finding of competency is adequately supported by 
the record.’”  732 N.W.2d at 238 (citations omitted). 
 190. MINN. R. EVID. 103 (“Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which 
admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected . . .”).  
 191. 497 U.S. 836 (1990). 
 that there are times when the right to confrontation 
must give way to other powerful societal interests, such as 
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protecting children from additional trauma by testifying in the 
physical presence of their alleged abuser.192  The Supreme Court 
held that one-way, closed-circuit testimony did not violate the 
Confrontation Clause when: (1) the court determines that it is 
necessary “to protect the welfare of the particular child witness;” 
(2) the court finds “that the child witness would be traumatized, 
not by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the 
defendant;” and (3) “the trial court [finds] that the emotional 
distress suffered by the child witness in the presence of the 
defendant is more than de minimis.”193
 Several courts and commentators have questioned whether 
Craig is still good law after Crawford.  Crawford expressly rejected the 
balancing of constitutional rights against societal interests that 
Craig adopts.
 
194
However, lower courts have not yet accepted this argument.  In 
fact, several courts have upheld Craig in light of challenges after 
Crawford.
  Moreover, Craig’s critics argue that Crawford rests 
on a foundation of originalism.  The Court purported to recognize 
only those exceptions to the right of confrontation that were in 
effect when the Bill of Rights was adopted.  By this reasoning, a 
process of testifying through one- or two-way video was not within 
the imagination of the Framers, who emphasized “face-to-face” 
confrontation.  By rejecting exceptions to the right of 
confrontation, even those exceptions based on reliability of the 
evidence, one might argue that the Court has implicitly overruled 
Craig.   
195
 
 192. Id. at 853. 
 193. Id. at 855–56 (citations omitted).   See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 43, which was 
amended to codify Craig and provides in relevant part:   
In Open Court. At trial, the witnesses’ testimony must be taken in open 
court unless a federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, these rules, 
or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court provide otherwise. For 
good cause in compelling circumstances and with appropriate 
safeguards, the court may permit testimony in open court by 
contemporaneous transmission from a different location. 
The Eighth Circuit found this rule unconstitutional as applied in United States v. 
Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548 (8th Cir. 2005) because the district court found that the 
child was afraid of both the defendant and testifying in the courtroom setting, an 
inadequate showing of necessity under Craig.  
    194.   Compare Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67–68 (“By replacing categorical 
constitutional guarantees with open-ended balancing tests, we do violence to [the 
Framer’s] design”) with Craig, 487 U.S. at 553 (explaining the need to balance the 
right to confrontation against “other powerful societal interests”). 
  The reasoning of these courts is that if Crawford had 
 195. See, e.g., United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1313–18 (11th Cir. 2006); 
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overruled Craig, it would have done so explicitly.  In addition, 
Crawford is easily distinguishable from Craig.  Crawford only decided 
when the use of hearsay evidence at trial violates the Confrontation 
Clause.196  Craig, in contrast, was not about whether confrontation 
was available to the accused but rather what form of confrontation 
is required.197  Moreover, some of these same courts note that 
Crawford’s target was the reliability test of Roberts,198 which is not 
implicated by Craig.  Finally, Professor Myrna Raeder argued that 
“Craig has not produced the parade of horribles that Crawford so 
dramatically portrayed as justification for jettisoning Roberts.  
Indeed, Craig has provided a sensible solution for an intractable 
problem: providing cross-examination of abused children who are 
traumatized.”199  This article argues that Roberts was not responsible 
for the alleged “parade of horribles” attributed to it in Crawford but 
rather the Court’s own incomprehensible application of Roberts in 
Lilly v. Virginia.200
 
United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 553–54 (8th Cir. 2005); State v. Henriod, 
131 P.3d 232, 237 (Utah 2006); State v. Blanchette, 134 P.3d 19, 29 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2006); State v. Griffin, 202 S.W.3d 670, 680–81 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006); State v. 
Vogelsberg, 724 N.W.2d 649, 654 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006); United States v. Pack, 65 
M.J. 381, 383–84 (C.A.A.F. 2007). 
 196. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004). 
 197. Craig, 497 U.S. at 860. 
 198. 448 U.S. 56 (1980), overruled by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004). 
 199. Myrna Raeder, Comments on Child Abuse Litigation in a “Testimonial” World: 
The Intersection of Competency, Hearsay, and Confrontation, 82 IND. L.J. 1009, 1016 
(2007).  Professor Raeder also cites empirical research that suggests that when 
children are shielded, the jury may find the child lacks credibility, even if the 
child’s testimony is reliable.  Id. at 1018.  She suggests that when a shield is used, 
prosecutors should be able to introduce expert testimony to explain the presence 
of the screen and thus counteract the non-intuitive conclusion that children who 
have some kind of shield are less reliable.  Id.  Although Professor Raeder 
acknowledges the Daubert problems with such expert testimony, she suggests that 
the defense should be deemed to waive a Daubert (expert) testimony objection if it 
implies or suggests that the child is less reliable because of the lack of face-to-face 
confrontation.  Id. 
 200. 527 U.S. 116 (1999). 
  Nevertheless, I agree with Professor Raeder that 
the argumentum ad terrorem used in Crawford would not work to 
overrule Craig.  Craig is grounded in the pragmatic availability of 
advanced technology and an awareness of the problem of child 
abuse and has not generated the controversy and criticism 
produced by Roberts.  Even if Craig is still good law after Crawford, 
the Court in Craig made clear that a child’s “trauma” or “emotional 
distress” from the adversarial or courtroom proceeding is not 
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sufficient grounds to dispense with face-to-face confrontation.201  
Such trauma or emotional distress, however, can be a serious 
problem if it interferes with a child’s ability to communicate or 
recall events.  But researchers, child advocates, and criminal justice 
specialists are trying to provide better guidance to judges and 
prosecutors to help make the process of testifying less intimidating 
and frightening for vulnerable witnesses.202
C. Defense Stategies for Excluding  “Nontestimonial” Evidence  
  Again, the key is to 
making the child sufficiently comfortable and competent to take 
the stand, thus invoking the “Warm Breathing Body” rule so that 
the child’s out-of-court testimony can be introduced through other 
witnesses. 
The first three suggestions of this part of the article203
The reliability of evidence traditionally has been regulated by 
the rules of evidence.  As noted earlier, one of the strongest 
objections to Roberts was that it conflated the Confrontation Clause 
and the hearsay rule.
 all allow 
for greater admissibility of out-of-court statements, even where 
those statements are “testimonial” because they all work toward 
putting the witness on the stand to testify in some fashion.  
However, a trial court needs to balance the right of the defendant 
to exclude unreliable evidence along with the prosecution’s need 
for evidence.   
204  Thus, if a statement, other than one made 
while testifying in the court proceeding, was offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted,205
 
 201. Craig, 497 U.S. at 838. 
 one could object that both 
the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause were violated.  If the 
hearsay objection was overruled, however, one could generally also 
beat the Confrontation Clause objection, especially if the hearsay 
 202. See Raeder, supra note 39 at 1013 (“Obviously, the reason for 
incompetency is significant, since the inability to discern truth from falsity cannot 
be immediately fixed, while the failure to communicate with the jury often can.”).  
In a separate article, Professor Raeder called attention to a free but valuable 
resource available online for download: American Prosecutors’ Research Institute:  
Finding Words:  Half a Nation by 2010:  Interviewing Children and Preparing for 
Court, http://ndaa.org/pdf/finding_words_ 2003.pdf (last visited May 18, 2009) 
cited at Raeder, Legal Profession’s Response, supra note 45.      
 203. These recommendations include the “Warm Breathing Body Rule,” better 
witness competency assessments, and increased use of shields where necessary. 
 204. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
 205. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
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exception was “firmly rooted,” and, usually, it was.  Thus, under 
Roberts, the problem was that by finding a “firmly rooted hearsay 
exception” one usually got a “two-fer”: beating both the hearsay 
rule and the Confrontation Clause objections.  Crawford’s value is 
that it has de-coupled the Confrontation Clause from the hearsay 
rule.  Now, even if an out-of-court statement may be admitted for its 
truth under every hearsay exception known to humanity, it cannot 
be admitted if: (1) the hearsay declarant is unavailable to testify at 
trial; (2) there was no prior opportunity to cross-examine the 
hearsay declarant; and (3) the hearsay declarant’s statement is 
“testimonial” (whatever that means).206
But in the effort and confusion to learn and figure out how to 
apply Crawford’s analysis, defense lawyers and trial courts sometimes 
overlook important evidentiary issues that exist to screen out 
unreliable evidence.  Now that “reliability” is no longer the 
concern of the Confrontation Clause,
 
207
1. Taking The Personal Knowledge Requirement Seriously  
 it is time to apply the 
evidence rules with greater rigor.   
One evidentiary concept that needs to be applied with greater 
care is this: all witnesses, including hearsay declarants, must have 
personal knowledge of the subject of their testimony.208
The judge decides whether the witness has made an 
adequate oath or affirmation and can communicate with 
the jury, for these are issues of “competency” under Fed. 
R. Evid. 104(a), but the jury decides whether the witness 
has adequate perception and memory, for these matters 
are considered to be issues of conditional relevancy under 
Fed. R. Evid. 104(b) and the judge plays only a screening 
role, barring a witness from testifying only if there is not 
enough evidence of perception and memory to enable a 
  This rule, 
codified in Federal and Minnesota Rules of Evidence 602, has great 
significance in the case of testimony from difficult witnesses, 
including children.  The requirement of “personal knowledge” is 
closely related to, but not distinct from, the concept of 
“competency.”  Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick summarize the 
key distinction as it is applied in court: 
 
 206. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). 
 207. Id. at 61–62.  
 208. See FED. R. EVID. 602. 
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reasonable jury to rely on the witness.209
Although a hearsay declarant is a person who makes a 
statement other than while testifying at trial, a declarant is as much 
as witness to the truth of disputed facts as an in-court witness when 
the out-of-court statement is offered for its truth.
 
Putting a warm breathing body on the witness stand—someone 
who is capable of and understands the importance of rejecting false 
statements of fact—may defeat both competency and 
Confrontation Clause objections under today’s law.  In addition, an 
out-of-court statement may beat a hearsay objection through a 
hearsay exception.  Nonetheless, a trial court must still determine 
whether the out-of-court declarant has a basis for knowing first-
hand what he or she is talking about.   
210  While a hearsay 
exception may be justified because necessity or factors of reliability 
substitute for the chance to cross-examine the declarant, there is 
no substitute for proof that the hearsay declarant could see, hear, 
touch, smell or taste whatever it is the declarant is describing, 
explaining, commenting—and ultimately testifying—about.  The 
burden of showing that the witness or declarant had an adequate 
opportunity to observe whatever he or she is testifying about is on 
the party offering the statement, not on the objecting party.211
Take the case of an anonymous 911 call, in which the caller 
states that several light-skinned black men matching defendant’s 
description are shooting guns.
  
Thus, where the court cannot determine whether the declarant 
had first-hand knowledge, the court should exclude the statement. 
212  As with many hearsay declarants, 
there is no chance to consider the competency of the “witness,” 
because the witness is not available to testify at trial.  The statement 
might be admissible under the excited utterance or another 
exception to the hearsay rule.213
 
 209. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 145, § 6:2. 
 210. FED. R. EVID. 801(b)–(c); MINN. R. EVID. 801(b)–(c). 
 211. State v. Ferguson, 581 N.W.2d 824, 832 (Minn. 1988). 
 212. Although it predates the Crawford decision, these are the facts of Brown v. 
Keane, 355 F.3d 82 (2d.Cir. 2004). 
 213. FED. R. EVID. 803(2); MINN. R. EVID. 803(2).  
  Moreover, it might not pose a 
Confrontation Clause problem under the “testimonial” framework 
of Crawford and Davis because the caller was describing an on-going 
emergency.  Nevertheless, as the appellate court held in the actual 
case, the trial court properly excluded the 911 call because the 
prosecution failed to show that the caller saw who was firing the 
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shots: 
It is one of the most basic requirements of the law of 
evidence that a witness’s report may be admitted only 
where grounds exist for “a finding that the witness has 
personal knowledge of the matter” to which the statement 
relates. See Fed. R. Evid. 602. Ordinarily, such a witness’s 
account may be received only when given in open court, 
under oath, and subject to cross-examination. When the 
witness’s declaration was made out of court in excited 
circumstances, the excited utterance exception to the 
hearsay rule permits the receipt of the out-of-court 
statement, not under oath, and without opportunity for 
cross-examination. But the exception does not obviate the 
requirement that the declarant have personal knowledge 
of the subject of his report. . . . An assertion of fact based 
on conjecture and surmise, to which the declarant would 
not be allowed to testify if called to the witness box, does 
not become admissible under an exception to the hearsay 
rule merely because it was uttered out of court in a state of 
excitement. Where the People failed to show that the 
caller saw who was firing the shots outside the Phoenix 
Bar, the caller’s excitement cannot justify the receipt of 
his statement based on surmise that light-skinned black 
men wearing green coats were doing the shooting 214
This statement is as clear as one can find distinguishing the 
requirement of personal knowledge from the requirements of the 
“excited utterances” hearsay exception.
 
215
The rule requires that witnesses have firsthand 
knowledge.  It does not specifically refer to the declarant 
of a hearsay statement that is admitted subject to an 
exception to the hearsay rule.  With the exception of party 
admissions, which are admitted as a function of the 
adversary system (and are not hearsay under rule 
801(d)(2) the Courts have generally required that the 
declarant of a hearsay statement have firsthand 
   
The Advisory Committee Note to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 
602 is in accord with the federal approach:  
 
 214. Brown, 355 F.3d at 90 (citations omitted).   
 215. Id.  Unfortunately, the court was not as clear earlier in the opinion, where 
it muddied the concepts of competency and personal knowledge: “To be 
competent as evidence, however, the declarant’s factual assertion must rest on 
personal knowledge.”  Id.  Courts often mingle archaic and contemporary 
language but do so at the expense of clarity. 
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knowledge, before the hearsay statement is admissible.  
The rule should be read to continue this practice.216
 In State v. Holliday,
 
However, litigants and courts do not always pay as close attention to 
the personal knowledge requirement.   
217  the prosecution’s witness A.A. took the 
stand despite his many failures to recall the facts relating to a 
shooting in downtown Minneapolis.  He testified that his frequent 
use of the drug ecstasy might have damaged his memory.218  A.A. 
reportedly told the police in two different interviews that he was 
the real target of the defendant’s bullets.  The focus of the Holliday 
decision was whether A.A.’s testimony violated the Confrontation 
Clause.  As noted above, A.A.’s testimony did not violate the 
Confrontation Clause because of the “Warm Breathing Body” rule.  
Moreover, the trial court overruled the defendant’s hearsay 
objections and admitted A.A.’s out-of-court statements under the 
exception for “recorded recollections” and the “residual 
exception,” exception presumably because they were 
contemporaneously and reliably recorded or adopted by a witness 
at trial.219  However, that does not mean A.A.’s testimony should 
have been admissible.220
 The Minnesota Supreme Court noted that the witness A.A. had 
no recollection of the conversations he had with the police, or 
   
 
 216. MINN. R. EVID. 602 advisory committee cmt. (citations omitted).  The 
note’s reference to party admissions, which “are admitted as a function of the 
adversary system,” contains a questionable conclusion about the lack of a first-
hand knowledge requirement.  Id.  This observation may make sense where the 
statement is a personal or adopted statement of a party-opponent because the 
party can take the stand and explain the lack of first-hand knowledge; however, it 
makes no sense in the context of vicarious admissions, where a party may be held 
responsible for the statements of an agent or a co-conspirator who may be as 
unreliable as any other hearsay declarant without first-hand knowledge.  Because it 
may not be possible to call the agent or co-conspirator to the stand for cross-
examination or explanation of the lack of personal knowledge of the events in the 
statement, personal knowledge should be required for vicarious admissions. 
    217.   745 N.W.2d 556 (Minn. 2008). 
    218.   Id. at 561. 
    219.   Id.  See MINN. R. EVID. 803(5) (recorded recollections) and the residual 
hearsay exception of MINN. R. EVID. 803(24) (2006) (recodified Sept. 1, 2006, with 
MINN. R. EVID. 804(b)(5) (2006) to form MINN. R. EVID. 807). 
    220.    The Minnesota Supreme Court did not discuss the issue of whether the 
trial court erred in applying these exceptions to the hearsay rule, holding that any 
such error was harmless.  Holliday, 745 N.W.2d at 568.   
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later, with the prosecutors.221  Although it is unclear just from the 
appellate report, it appears that there was no foundation as to the 
basis of A.A.’s prior statements that he was the defendant’s real 
target, but there also was no objection on based on the lack of 
personal knowledge.  Thus, we do not know whether A.A. made 
statements accusing the defendant of wanting to kill him based on 
first-hand knowledge (by hearing defendant threaten him at the 
scene of the shooting?) or on the basis of reports from others 
(hearsay).  Because Holliday was a bench trial, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court might have found this evidentiary error to be 
harmless, as it did the alleged hearsay errors.222  The court stressed, 
however, that, at least as to the alleged hearsay issues, its decision 
might have been different if this had been a jury trial.223  In the 
bench trial, the district court judge specifically stated that he found 
A.A. to be not credible and did not rely on his testimony in finding 
the defendant guilty.224  If this was a jury trial, then one hopes that 
the appellate court (and trial counsel) would have paid more 
attention to the need for a foundation of personal knowledge of 
the underlying facts.225
 Sometimes an evidentiary objection, such as competency or 
lack of personal knowledge, can have as much bite as the 
Confrontation Clause.  In B.B. v. Commonweath,
 
226 the Kentucky 
Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in 
finding a four-year-old child competent to testify in a sexual abuse 
prosecution, reversing the defendant’s conviction, even though, as 
in Holliday, this was a bench trial.227
 
    221.   The Minnesota Court recognized that Owens was arguably distinguishable 
on this ground, because in that case, the hearsay declarant/victim recalled the 
prior conversation in which he identified his attacker to the F.B.I. agent.  Holliday, 
745 N.W.2d at 566.  
    222.   Id. at 568. 
    223.   Id. 
    224.   Id. 
    225.  There was also an issue of competency lurking in Holliday. On cross-
examination, A.A. admitted “that his regular ecstasy use possibly affected his 
ability to remember.”  Id. at 561.  However, the opinion does not state whether 
defendant’s counsel inquired further into A.A.’s ability to testify at trial or 
objected on grounds of competency. Cf. MINN. STAT. § 595.02(f) (2008) 
(“[P]ersons of unsound mind and persons intoxicated at the time of their 
production for examination are not competent witnesses if they lack capacity to 
remember or to relate truthfully facts respecting which they are examined.”). 
    226.    226 S.W.3d 47 (Ky. 2007). 
    227.    Id. at 49. 
  The court held that the trial 
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court should not have allowed the child to testify and should not 
have admitted the child’s out-of-court statements to a nurse and 
social worker, accusing the defendant of committing sex acts.  
Kentucky’s rule of competency is far broader than either the 
Federal or Minnesota Rules of Evidence, including a requirement 
of personal knowledge:  
   (b) Minimal qualifications. A person is disqualified to 
testify as a witness if the trial court determines that he: 
  (1) Lacked the capacity to perceive accurately the matters 
about which he proposes to testify; 
 (2) Lacks the capacity to recollect facts; 
 (3) Lacks the capacity to express himself so as to be 
understood, either directly or through an interpreter; or 
 (4) Lacks the capacity to understand the obligation of a 
witness to tell the truth.228
The Kentucky Supreme Court had trouble framing its holding 
under this statute, debating whether the problem was the child’s 
lack of ability to tell the truth or her inability to recollect facts.
   
229  
Yet all of its examples express frustration at the testimony’s lack of 
evidentiary reliability.230  What makes this case unique, however, is 
that the court also held that the child’s incompetency extended to 
her out-of-court statements, holding “that testimonial 
incompetence of a declarant should be an obstacle to the 
admission of the declarant’s out-of-court statements if the reason 
for the incompetence is one which would affect the reliability of 
the hearsay.” 231  Although the Kentucky court characterized the 
evidentiary problems here as ones of competency, one could also 
characterize the reliability problems here as resulting from a lack of 
first-hand knowledge.  There was evidence that the child may have 
learned about sexual acts from pornography her mother possessed 
as well as allegations that the mother had accused other relatives of 
sexual abuse.232
 
    228.   Id. (quoting KY. R. EVID. 601). 
    229.   Id. at 50–51. 
    230.   Id. at 49–50. 
    231.   Id. at 51 (citing and adopting the view of ROBERT G. LAWSON, THE 
KENTUCKY EVIDENCE LAW HANDBOOK675 n. 53 (4th ed.2003)). 
    232.    Id. at 48. 
  This does not appear to be a case where the 
appellate court did not believe the child; rather, the court simply 
did not see sufficient foundation from any witness (in-court or out-
of-court) that the evidence was based on first-hand experience 
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rather than on other sources.   
 How might United States v. Owens,233 have been decided if the 
requirement of personal knowledge had been considered more 
thoroughly?  Although the focus of the Supreme Court decision 
was on the application of the prior identification exemption to the 
hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause, the defense also raised 
the personal knowledge objection in a motion in limine before 
trial.234  Based on the government’s offer of proof, the trial court 
ruled that Foster, the in-court witness (and hearsay declarant), had 
personal knowledge of the identity of his attacker.235
Foster testified that he was walking down an aisle “when I 
felt an impact on my head . . . I looked down and saw 
blood on the floor and I-Now, I don’t remember seeing at 
this time-I don’t remember seeing the individual.” Foster 
then said that “[t]he next thing I remember after 
receiving the blow to the head is many days later in the 
hospital.” Finally, Foster stated that he could not recall 
“the person or persons” that struck him on the head. 
None of this testimony suggests that Foster saw his 
assailant. Indeed, it tends to suggest that he did not see 
his attacker and thus had no personal knowledge of the 
identity of his assailant.
  However, the 
testimony at trial did not match the prosecution’s offer of proof.  
In trial, Foster testified that he never saw his attacker: 
236
The appellate court noted that although the defense had made a 
continuing objection to Foster’s testimony on personal knowledge 
grounds, the trial court judge never revised his ruling.
 
237  The 
appellate court decided, in light of its ultimate rulings on hearsay 
and constitutional grounds, not to reach the issue of the 
declarant’s lack of personal knowledge regarding the attack and his 
attacker.238
The Owens facts are helpful in illuminating another source of 
confusion—the difference between the lack of personal knowledge 
of a hearsay declarant and the personal knowledge of an in-court 
witness who relates an out-of-court statement.  Foster (the declarant 
 
 
 233. 789 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’d, 484 U.S. 554 (1988). 
 234. Id. at 754. 
 235. Id. at 755 & n.4. 
 236. Id. at 755. 
 237. Id. at 755 n.4. 
 238. Id. 
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and in-court witness) was attacked on April 12, 1982.239  At trial, 
Foster testified that did not recall seeing or talking to the F.B.I. 
agent on his first visit to Foster’s hospital room on April 19, but 
Foster clearly recalled telling the agent about the attack on his 
second visit to the hospital, a few weeks later, on May 5.240  The 
appellate court stressed that Foster had personal knowledge of 
what he told the agent in the hospital on May 5 (that Owens 
attacked him).241  Moreover, the agent also had personal 
knowledge of what Foster told him on that date (that Owens was 
the attacker).242  However, neither Foster nor the F.B.I. agent had 
personal knowledge that Owens attacked Foster.243  Because the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and later, the Supreme Court, were 
so focused on applying the nuances of the hearsay rule and the 
intricacies of the Confrontation Clause analysis, they glossed over 
the lynchpin of evidentiary reliability.244
One of the reasons a court may treat the personal knowledge 
requirement so casually is that the evidentiary rule requires very 
minimal proof of personal knowledge.
 
245
[T]he location of the injuries provides support for the 
theory that Foster saw his attacker. On the other hand, it 
is possible that Foster was looking down or away and was 
taken by surprise when he was hit on the head; it is also 
possible that his assailant wore a mask or other disguise. 
Thus, the location of the injuries is not necessarily 
dispositive.
  For example, in Owens, 
the government argued that Foster’s wounds were all in the front 
of his body, thus suggesting that Foster must have seen his attacker. 
The appellate court agreed that:  
246
The appellate court used an unfortunate turn of phrase here, 
for the sufficiency test does not require the proof of personal 
knowledge to be “dispositive.”  Such a showing can be made with 
circumstantial evidence.
 
247
 
 239. 484 U.S. at 556. 
 240. Id. 
 241. 789 F.2d at 754. 
 242. 484 U.S. at 556. 
 243. See id. 
 244. The requirement that a witness, even a hearsay declarant, must have 
personal knowledge of the facts about which he or she testifies. 
 245. See FED. R. EVID. 602; MINN. R. EVID. 602 (requiring that evidence be 
“sufficient to support a finding.”).   
 246. Id. 
  Under Rule 602, the judge serves only a 
 247. Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 1985) (“Direct proof of 
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screening function of deciding only whether a reasonable juror 
could decide that the witness/declarant had personal knowledge of 
the identity of his attacker.248  Nonetheless, the appellate court was 
right to stress that in a criminal case, where the central issue was 
the identity of the attacker, the judge, in performing the screening 
function under Rule 602, must ensure that a jury will base its 
decision on more than speculation or imagination.249
The same requirement of first-hand knowledge applies to child 
witnesses
  It certainly 
would not have been an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
exclude Foster’s testimony (as well as the F.B.I. agent’s 
corroboration of Foster’s hospital room identification) on the 
grounds that there was an insufficient showing that they knew the 
identity of the attacker based on first-hand knowledge. 
250 and all other witnesses whether they testify in person or 
as a hearsay declarant.251  When a witness/declarant provides 
testimony in a criminal case about the identity of a perpetrator, 
courts should be especially careful about screening the source and 
circumstances of the witness/declarant’s knowledge of the 
perpetrator.  In State v. Ferguson,252
 
perception, or proof that forecloses all speculation, is not required. On the other 
hand, circumstantial evidence of the declarant’s personal perception must not be 
so scanty as to forfeit the ‘guarantees of trustworthiness’ that form the hallmark of 
all exceptions to the hearsay rule.”). 
 248. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 145.  See also FED. R. EVID. 602; MINN. 
R. EVID. 602 (both requiring “evidence sufficient to support a finding”). 
 249. Moreover, the appellate court was clearly concerned about the impact of 
Foster’s head injuries and potential suggestive comments and questions from 
Foster’s many visitors—none of whom Foster could recall (other than F.B.I. Agent 
Mansfield): 
Foster may have named Owens as a result of statements made to him 
during his hospital stay by one or more of his frequent visitors. 
Certainly the subject of the assault was one likely to arise when Foster 
and his friends or colleagues talked, and reports regarding the 
progress of the investigation may well have been conveyed to him. 
Unfortunately, as we have noted above, at the time of trial Foster had 
no recollection of any visits by persons other than Mansfield or the 
conversations that occurred during those visits. 
United States v. Owens, 789 F.2d 750, 754 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’d, 484 U.S. 554 (1988). 
 250. See State v. Richardson, 670 N.W.2d 267, 282–83 (Minn. 2003) (applying 
personal knowledge requirement to hearsay statements from child declarants). 
 251. FED. R. EVID. 602. 
 252. 581 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 1998). 
 the Minnesota Supreme Court 
held that the trial court erred when it concluded that a hearsay 
declarant’s identification of the shooter was admissible because it 
was the declarant’s “conclusion based on what happened earlier 
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and it is his opinion which is permissible in this situation.”253  The 
court noted that the statement was offered under the dying 
declaration exception and stated that trial courts should apply 
especially stringent admissibility rules regarding first-hand 
knowledge where the statement is offered to identify the 
perpetrator of a crime.254  Thus, the court concluded that where 
“the declarant’s identification is simply a result of reasoning from 
collateral facts, the statement should not be admitted.”255  Although 
the court held that the trial court’s error was harmless,256
2. Get Serious About the Hearsay Rule and its Exceptions 
 it 
provides a good example of the need to enforce the evidentiary 
rule of personal knowledge for all witnesses. 
One reason it is crucial to determine the basis of a witness or 
declarant’s knowledge of the facts is that it may reveal another layer 
of hearsay.  For example, in the Owens case, F.B.I. Agent Mansfield, 
who testified at trial did have personal knowledge, but his personal 
knowledge consisted only of a hearsay statement (Foster told him 
that Owens was the attacker).257
In narrowing the application of the Confrontation Clause to 
testimonial statements in Crawford, Justice Scalia stated that the 
States retained flexibility in developing their hearsay rules to 
exclude nontestimonial statements.
  While that made Mansfield an 
acceptable in-court witness as to Foster’s prior identification, it 
could not satisfy the requirement that Foster have first-hand 
knowledge of who attacked him.  Getting serious about the 
personal knowledge requirement is the first step to getting serious 
about the rest of the evidentiary rules, including the hearsay rule 
and its exceptions in criminal cases.  Trial courts and defense 
attorneys must determine whether the witness has first-hand 
knowledge or is the witness simply testifying about hearsay, or 
perhaps even double or triple hearsay. 
258
 
 253. Id. at 832. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 833. 
 256. Id. 
   257.  Owens, 789 F.2d at 752. 
 258. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
  But this can only happen if 
we start to honestly and critically examine the rationales for many 
of the most commonly used hearsay exceptions, such as excited 
utterances, dying declarations, and statements made for purpose of 
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medical diagnosis or treatment.  These exceptions share a common 
reliability rationale, which allegedly provides an adequate substitute 
for cross-examination.  The hearsay declarant is presumed to be 
reliable because he or she is not thinking about fabricating 
evidence.  In the case of excited utterances and dying declarations, 
the declarant is presumed to be either not thinking at all (excited 
utterances) or to be thinking of the next stop in his or her spiritual 
journey (dying declarations).  In the case of statements made for 
purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, the declarant, who by 
definition has some medical or psychological illness or injury, is 
allegedly thinking only of getting better.  Although it is always good 
for a cheap laugh, evidence professors grow weary of teaching 
generations of law students about the absurdity of these 
rationales.259
It is important to think about why certain hearsay exceptions 
exist and how they relate to each other.  For example, in State v. 
Holliday, the trial court admitted the statements of a witness who 
did not remember making them (or the underlying facts contained 
in the statement) under the hearsay exception for recorded 
recollections and the residual exception.
  Moreover, even if these rationales were grounded in 
reality, they only address the danger of insincerity and not the 
dangers of memory, perception or communicative ambiguity that 
will go untested by cross-examination when a statement is admitted 
under a hearsay exception. 
260  However, all of these 
statements were in fact, double-hearsay.  Under Minnesota Rule of 
Evidence 805, multiple hearsay is not admissible unless each layer 
of hearsay is covered by a hearsay exception. This common 
evidentiary problem is not discussed in the opinion.  The first layer 
of hearsay is A.A.’s statement to the law enforcement officials (first 
to the police officer and later, the prosecutors).261
 
 259. See Eileen A. Scallen, Constitutional Dimensions of Hearsay Reform:  Toward a 
Three-Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 MINN. L. REV. 623, 651 n.10 (1992) 
(collecting scholarship that is critical of the “excited utterance” or “spontaneous 
exclamation” exception from 1928 onward). 
   260.  745 N.W.2d 556, 568–59 (Minn. 2008). 
   261.     Id. at 560–61. 
  The second 
layer of hearsay is the out-of-court memorials that the law 
enforcement officers testified from (Sergeant Charlie Adams 
testified off his own report of his interview with A.A.; a paralegal 
from the prosecutor’s office testified off of Adams’ report and a 
memorandum in the prosecutor’s file memorializing the interviews 
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with A.A.).262  To the degree that any hearsay exception applied to 
those documents, it covered only the documents themselves 
(assuming the proper foundation for the recorded recollection and 
residual exceptions were laid), but not A.A.’s original statements.  
No hearsay exception covers A.A.’s original statements to the law 
enforcement officers.263  Moreover, by allowing these law 
enforcement documents to be used against the defendant (even if 
they were only read into evidence), the trial court violated the spirit 
of the public records exception to the hearsay rule, Minnesota. 
Rule of Evidence 803(8)(B), which was more directly on point than 
the hearsay exceptions offered by the prosecution. The public 
records exception expressly excludes documents produced by law 
enforcement agencies to be used against a criminal defendant.264 
Thus to allow the officer’s police report and the prosecutor’s 
memos to be offered as recorded recollection or under the residual 
exception was to allow an end-run around a key statutory limitation 
of the public records exception.265
This argument is not an attempt to embarrass or second-guess 
a very hard-working trial judge, who may not have been presented 
with these objections and arguments.  Rather, it merely illustrates 
that at times, the evidence rules do provide sufficient grounds for 
excluding unreliable evidence, even though one’s first instinct may 
be to gravitate toward the Confrontation Clause objection.  Many of 
the issues of reliability raised by the testimony of a child or other 
difficult witnesses could be handled not only under the hearsay 
rule and its exceptions, but also under the basic rules of relevancy 
(401 and 403).  Evidence of questionable reliability has little or no 
probative value.  Evidence with no probative value fails the 
relevancy test of Rule 401.  If evidence has minimal probative value 
and passes Rule 401’s standard, it is still worth spelling out the 
unreliability of the evidence.  Evidence with little probative value is 
    
 
   262.    Id. 
    263.   See MINN. R. EVID. 805. 
    264.   See MINN. R. EVID. 803(8) (excepting from the hearsay rule “matters 
observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to 
report, (but) excluding, however, in criminal cases and petty misdemeanors 
matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel”). 
    265.   Cf. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d. 45, 70 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that 
prosecution could not subvert limitation of Rule 803(8)(B) by using the more 
generic business records exception, 803(6), which did not restrict the use of 
business records in criminal cases). 
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far easier to exclude under Rule 403 than would otherwise be the 
case.  If trial courts applied the hearsay rule and its exceptions to 
see if their promise of reliability is meaningful in a given context 
and used Rules 401 and 403 to exclude unreliable evidence, a trial 
court might never have to reach a Confrontation Clause issue.   
I am not suggesting that trial judges rewrite the hearsay or 
other evidence rules.  Rewriting the hearsay rule and its exceptions 
is, of course, beyond the pay grade of state and federal trial judges 
in their daily work, although they do have a fair amount of input in 
the rulemaking process, at least at the federal level.266
[t]here may be a temptation among judges to let pity for small 
children who may have been victimized . . . overcome their 
duty to enforce the rules of evidence. . . . “The rules of 
evidence have evolved carefully and painstakingly over 
hundreds of years as the best system for arriving at the truth. 
They bring to the law its objectivity. Their purpose would be 
subverted if courts were permitted to disregard them at will . . . 
[O]beying these rules is the best way to produce evidence of a 
quality likely to produce a just result.”
  However, as 
is stated in nearly every appellate decision touching on evidence, 
trial court judges have great discretion in making evidentiary 
rulings.  One cannot imagine or understate the difficulty of 
exercising that discretion when heinous crimes are alleged.  But as 
the Kentucky Supreme Court observed in a child sexual abuse case:   
267
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Even in the most difficult criminal cases, evidence law matters—
and maybe when it matters most. 
My last scholarly article about the Confrontation Clause was 
published seventeen years ago.268
 
 266. See generally, Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing the Politics of [Evidence] 
Rulemaking, 53 HASTINGS L.J.  843 (2002) (describing the federal rulemaking 
process and critiquing the political interests involved). 
    267.    Commonwealth v. B.B., 226 S.W.3d at 50 (citations omitted). 
 268. Scallen, supra note 40. 
  Since that time, I watched the 
pendulum swing from a Confrontation Clause that was little more 
than a constitutionalized hearsay rule to a Confrontation Clause 
stuck somewhere in the eighteenth century.  The Court’s emphasis 
on the evidentiary (reliability) dimension of confrontation in 
Roberts made the Confrontation Clause superfluous when the 
statement fit a firmly rooted hearsay exception.  That was wrong, 
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and I was one of many who said so at the time.  However, the 
current Confrontation Clause jurisprudence is intellectually and 
ethically bankrupt.  It is used to exclude a videotape of trained 
investigators questioning a vulnerable child witness whose memory 
will only likely deteriorate with time.  But it allows the use of 
evidentiary statements made by hysterical, unavailable declarants 
whose ability to perceive, recall, and communicate key facts is 
questionable.  Those key facts will not and cannot be meaningfully 
tested by cross-examination when those statements are made to a 
parent or other nongovernmental person outside the courtroom 
simply because those statements are “nontestimonial.” 
Until now, I have refused to write about Crawford and its 
progeny, preferring to spend my time in the twenty-first century, 
doing many continuing legal education sessions with state trial 
judges, both in Minnesota and California.  We work together to 
understand, apply, and teach Crawford.  But other scholars have 
been highly critical of Crawford, arguing that its historical/orginalist 
analysis is defective.269  Some wrote insightful articles attempting to 
create legal frameworks or interpretations that would clarify the 
Crawford Court’s concept of “testimonial” evidence.270  Crawford 
stimulated law student scholars to propose innovative approaches 
to the problems raised by child witnesses.271
 
 269. Thomas Y. Davies, Not the Framers’ Design: How the Framing-Era Ban Against 
Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of 
the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 BROOK. J.L. & POL’Y 349 (2007); Thomas Y. 
Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It? Fictional Originalism 
in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005); Randolph N. Jonakait, 
The (Futile) Search for a Common Law Right of Confrontation: Beyond Brasier’s 
Irrelevance to (Perhaps) Relevant American Cases, 15 J. L. & POL’Y 471 (2007); 
Randolph N. Jonakait, The Too-Easy Historical Assumptions of Crawford v. 
Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 219 (2005). 
 270. Ellen Yiang Lee, Confronting the “Ongoing Emergency”:  A Pragmatic Approach 
to Hearsay Evidence in the Context of the Sixth Amendment, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 729 
(2008) (“providing an analytical approach to aid courts in defining an ‘ongoing 
emergency’ in the context of problematic relationships”); Robert P. Mosteller, 
Testing the Testimonial Concept  and Exceptions to Confrontation:  “A Little Child Shall 
Lead Them”, 82 IND. L.J. 917 (2007) (advocating that, among other ideas, focus 
should be on the questioner’s purpose in determining whether a statement is 
“testimonial.”); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle: Domestic Violence and 
the Right of Confrontation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2006) (applying Crawford’s testimonial 
approach in the prosecution of domestic violence). 
  Some scholars have 
 271. Anna Richey-Allen, Note, Presuming Innocence: Expanding the Confrontation 
Clause Analysis to Protect Children and Defendants in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 1090 (2009) (advocating the use of evidentiary presumptions to 
facilitate the admission or exclusion of evidence produced through child advocacy 
centers that investigate child abuse); Jonathan Scher, Note, Out-of-Court Statements 
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written excellent articles suggesting, among other things, legislative 
and other institutional law reform responses to Crawford.272  Finally, 
as noted earlier, other scholars created or joined multidisciplinary 
teams to analyze, develop, test (empirically) and critique methods 
and approaches of handling child or other vulnerable witnesses.273
There are signs that the popularity of Justice Scalia’s 
 
 
by Victims of Child Sexual Abuse to Multidisciplinary Teams: A Confrontation Clause 
Analysis, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 167 (2009) (arguing that the use of forensic interview 
techniques produces statements that are nontestimonial in accordance with 
Crawford and its progeny). 
 272. See Lininger, supra note 4, at 783–818  (discussing legislative proposals to 
facilitate pretrial cross-examination in domestic violence cases, such as requiring 
non-waivable preliminary hearings, special hearings for cross-examination, and 
depositions, along with many other proposals to adapt the hearsay rules and 
procedures for prosecuting domestic violence cases more sensitive to the unique 
problems of proof posed by these cases); Myrna S. Raeder,  Enhancing the Legal 
Profession’s Response to Victims of  Child Abuse, 24 CRIM. JUST. 12, 15–19 (Spring 2009) 
(discussing many recommendations for the treatment of victims of child abuse, 
including the appointment of guardian ad litem, so the child victim has more of a 
voice in court); Myrna S. Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too 71 
BROOK. L. REV. 311, 315 (2005) (advocating “evidentiary creativity,” with increased 
attention to creating new hearsay exceptions when the declarant testifies using 
expert testimony and prior act evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) 
and its state counterparts).  
 273. Thomas D. Lyon, Speaking with Children: Advice from Investigative 
Interviewers, in HANDBOOK FOR THE TREATMENT OF ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN 
65 (P. F. Talley, ed., 2005); Thomas D. Lyon et al., Coaching, Truth Induction, and 
Young Maltreated Children’s False Allegations and False Denials, 79 CHILD DEV. 914 
(2008); Thomas D. Lyon & Joyce S. Dorado, Truth Induction in Young Maltreated 
Children: The Effects of Oath-Taking and Reassurance on True and False Disclosures, 32 
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 738 (2008); Thomas D. Lyon et al., Reducing Maltreated 
Children’s Reluctance to Answer Hypothetical Oath-Taking Competency Questions, 25 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 81 (2001); Thomas D. Lyon, Child Witnesses and the Oath: Empirical 
Evidence, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1023 (2000); Livia L Gilstrap, Child Witnesses: Common 
Ground and Controversies in the Scientific Community, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 59 
(2005); Michael R. Keenan, Child Witnesses: Implications of Contemporary Suggestibility 
Research in a Changing Legal Landscape, 26 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 100 (2007); 
Amy Russell, Best Practices in Child Forensic Interviews: Interview Instructions and Truth-
Lie Discussions, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 99 (2006) (literature review); Paul 
Wagland & Kay Bussey, Factors That Facilitate and Undermine Children’s Beliefs About 
Truth Telling, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 639 (2005); Michael E. Lamb et al., Structured 
Forensic Interview Protocol Improves the Quality and Informativeness of Investigative 
Interviews with Children: A Review of Research Using the NICHD Investigative Interview 
Protocol, 31 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1201 (2007), available at 
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=2180422#id398384; 
Angela D. Evans et al., Complex Questions Asked by Defense Lawyers But Not Prosecutors 
Predicts Convictions in Child Abuse Trials, LAW & HUM. BEHAV. (forthcoming 2009) 
available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? article=1057&context= 
thomaslyon). 
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originalism, as applied to the Confrontation Clause, is waning.  
This article, however, took a different path by demonstrating that 
there are many ways for prosecutors and defense attorneys to look 
beyond the constitutional conundrums as they try their cases and 
for trial judges to do what they do best by using their intelligence, 
diligence and judgment to reach a fair result in each particular 
case.  Even if we are stuck with Crawford, we can cope.   
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